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Witchcraft and Statecraft: Liberal Democracy in
Africa
NELSON TEBBE*
This Article addresses the prospects of liberal democracy in non-Western societ-
ies. It focuses on South Africa, one of the newest and most admired liberal
democracies, and in particular on its efforts to recognize indigenous African tradi-
tions surrounding witchcraft and related occult practices. In 2004, Parliament
passed a law that purports to regulate certain occult practitioners called traditional
healers. Today, lawmakers are under pressure to go further and criminalize the
practice of witchcraft itself. This Article presses two arguments. First, it contends
that the 2004 statute is compatible with liberal principles of equal citizenship and
the rule of law. Second, it warns against outlawing witchcraft as such. Subjecting
suspected sorcerers to criminal punishment based on governmental determinations
of guilt that many will perceive to be unprincipled would work too much damage to
individual autonomy and national unity, among other values. These arguments are
designed to contribute to a wider discussion about the capacity of liberalism to
respond to the global resurgence of religious traditionalism, especially in countries
where traditionalists may comprise a large majority of the citizenry.
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WITCHCRAFT AND STATECRAFT
INTRODUCTION
What are the prospects of liberal democracy in traditional societies? New
states everywhere are embracing familiar ideas and institutions, including
popular sovereignty, constitutionalism, individual rights, separation of pow-
ers, and judicial review. Yet they are refiguring those concepts to fit societies
that differ dramatically from those of the West. Worldwide liberalism's
fundamental challenges therefore may come not only from the culture war in
the United States, significant as that conflict may be, but equally from
struggles to adapt democracy to religious and cultural conditions in Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East. This Article focuses on the encounter between
liberal democracy and African traditions in South Africa. It argues that while
liberalism has enormous capacity to accommodate African traditions-far
greater, in fact, than has generally been acknowledged-that political form
nevertheless cannot tolerate every local accommodation of religion and
culture. Many such efforts should be welcomed by liberals, but others ought
to be vigorously resisted.
South Africa is among the newest and most celebrated of the world's
democracies. Its government has wholeheartedly embraced constitutional-
ism in the context of remarkable diversity. Various African groups share the
land with Afrikaners, English-speaking whites, South Asians, and so-called
colored people of mixed ancestry, among others. Eleven languages enjoy
official status. That cultural dissensus has been sharpened recently by a
critical ideological shift-a resurgence of traditionalism that reflects global
developments.
Today, new political movements are challenging some of the basic tenets that
drove the struggle against the apartheid regime. When the constitution came
into force in 1996, it committed the nation to liberal ideas that had been central
to the opposition, especially "non-racialism and non-sexism," equal citizenship,
individual rights, and the rule of law.' Now many people feel that the democ-
racy has failed to protect citizens, to unite the country, and to enforce constitu-
tional rights. One feature that unifies these contemporary movements-
variously called Africanization, the African Renaissance, and African
jurisprudence 2 -is a demand for greater legal accommodation of African tradi-
tions. Prominent politicians and intellectuals are moving away from a philoso-
phy of non-racialism understood as governmental blindness toward differences
1. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 1, 3.
2. See ADAM ASHFORTH, WrrcHcRAFr, VIOLENCE, AND DEMocRAcy 150, 285-86 (2005) (discussing the
African Renaissance in particular and the legal accommodation of traditionalism in general); John L.
Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Criminal Justice, Cultural Justice, 31 Am. ETHNOLOGIST 188, 189 (2004)
(discussing African jurisprudence); Johannes Harnischfeger, Witchcraft and the State in South Africa, in
WrrcHcRAFr, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN SoUTH AFRICA 40, 66 (John Hund ed., 2003) (discussing
Africanization); Khaukanani N. Mavhungu, Heroes, Villains and the State in South Africa's Witchcraft
Zone, 7 AR. ANTHROPOLOGIST 114, 117 (2000) (referencing "calls for a strong Africa ... and [for an]
African Renaissance").
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of culture.3 They are demanding African solutions to what they see as uniquely
African problems.4
Witchcraft tops the list of those unique problems. In colonial times, witch-
craft was thought to be "the outstanding problem of the lawgiver in Africa.",
5
Today it remains central to statecraft. Fear of the occult6 has not faded with
apartheid but, surprisingly to many, has only intensified during the transition to
democracy.7 Witch killings rose dramatically in the early 1990s, 8 and since then
ethnographic accounts have described an occult epidemic affecting rural and
urban areas throughout the country.9 Whether or not magical practices them-
selves are on the rise, certainly attacks on suspected witches continue today, 0
and locals have reported a widespread sense of vulnerability to bewitchment in
both city and country." A large majority of the citizenry believes in witchcraft.
One measure of witchcraft's perceived prevalence is the frequency with
which people defend against it. In daily life, citizens guard against attack not
primarily by hunting down witches but by hiring traditional healers (a term that
has replaced the pejorative "witch doctors"). These specialists-also commonly
known as inyangas and sangomas-sell security by purporting to harness occult
forces for good, to defend against supernatural harm and sometimes even to
3. Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff, Reflections on Liberalism, Policulturalism, and ID-ology:
Citizenship and Difference in South Africa, 9 Soc. IDErms 445, 449 (2003) [hereinafter Comaroff &
Comaroff, Reflections on Liberalism] (noting that these leaders have begun to "revise the 'post-ethnic'
universalism to which most of the [ANC leadership] was once fervently committed"); John Comaroff &
Jean Comaroff, Policing Culture, Cultural Policing: Law and Social Order in Postcolonial South
Africa, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 513, 522 (2004) [hereinafter Comaroff & Comaroff, Policing Culture].
4. John Hund, Witchcraft and Accusations of Witchcraft in South Africa: Ontological Denial and the
Suppression of African Justice, 33 CILSA 366, 385 (2000); Isak Niehaus, Witchcraft in the New South
Africa: A Critical Overview of the Ralushai Commission Report, in WrrcAcRrAr, VioLENcE AND Tm LAW
iN SoUTm AFRICA, supra note 2, at 93, 103.
5. MARTIN CrANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFIucAN LEGAL CULTURE 1902-1936: FEAR, FAvOUR AND
PREJDicE 321 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
6. Throughout, I use the noun "occult" to mean the realm of the supernatural, specifically of
witchcraft and traditional healing. The adjective "occult," similarly, means of or pertaining to the
supernatural power involved in witchcraft or traditional healing.
7. Comaroff & Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at 514; Isak Niehaus, Witches and Zombies
of the South African Lowveld: Discourse, Accusations, and Subjective Reality, 11 J. ROYAL ANTHROPO-
LOGICAL INST. 191, 199 (2005) ("Discourses about witches and zombies have remained prominent, even
in recent times ....") (citation omitted).
8. Comaroff & Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at 513; Comaroff & Comaroff, Reflections
on Liberalism, supra note 3, at 448 & 467 n.7; Witchcraft in South Africa, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at
85.
9. See Adam Ashforth, An Epidemic of Witchcraft? The Implications of AIDS for the Post-Apartheid
State, 61 AF. STUD. 121, 122 (2002); Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff, Alien-Nation: Zombies,
Immigrants, and Millennial Capitalism, 101 S. ATLANTc Q. 779, 779 (2002) (noting that belief in
zombies had reached "epic, epidemic proportions").
10. See, e.g., Prega Govender, Witch-Hunting Youths Burn Dozens of Homes After Sportsmen Die,
SUNDAY TPMEs (South Africa), Feb. 27, 2005, at 8 (reporting on an attack on scores of suspected
witches); Suspected Witch Dies After Mob Attack, INDlP. ONLINE (South Africa), Oct. 15, 2006
(describing the death of a woman accused of witchcraft and stoned by a mob in the Eastern Cape).
11. See ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 17-18 (discussing vulnerability in the city); Comaroff &
Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at 514 (discussing vulnerability in the country).
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retaliate against witches themselves.' 2 Traditional healers, who number in the
hundreds of thousands, claim to derive their curative power from otherworldly
forces and from special relationships with the ancestors.' 3 According to the
South African Department of Health, some eighty percent of the population
consults them. '
4
Witchcraft presents a problem of justice. To see this, consider a basic
definition: A witch is a human being who secretly uses supernatural power for
the purpose of harming others. Occult aggression is always believed to be
caused by another human being acting out of malevolence.' 5 Belief in the occult
therefore gives ordinary misfortune a moral significance: Once hardship is
attributed to sorcery, it is transformed from something senseless into the mean-
ingful result of human volition. Witchcraft, in other words, is seen to cause not
simply suffering, which can result from a natural disaster or an illness, but
harm, understood as the product of intentional action.' 6 Consequently, sorcery
is perceived to be unjust in much the same way as physical violence. And when
citizens are subject to injustice at the hands of others, whether by physical or
occult means, they call on government to punish, retaliate, and deter. Many
Africans feel that such a governmental imperative is particularly strong in a
democracy because that form of government carries a special obligation to serve
the people and to guarantee them the personal security necessary for the full
exercise of political freedoms.17 Because disappointed citizens may comprise a
significant majority of the population, their complaints could weaken the govern-
ment's legitimacy and stability.
Existing law only exacerbates their sense of injustice. The Witchcraft Suppres-
sion Act, an apartheid-era statute based on earlier colonial models that remains
on the books today, outlaws a wide variety of occult-related practices, including
accusing someone of witchcraft and practicing traditional medicine.' 8 Although
the Act also criminalizes the practice of witchcraft, that provision has generally
not been enforced, due to the difficulty of prosecuting a crime for which there is
12. The Zulu terms inyanga and sangoma are the most widespread, but the Sotho ngaka and Xhosa
igqirha are also common. Although academic and elite discourse distinguishes between the two
terms-inyanga meaning an herbalist who does not possess clairvoyant powers and sangoma referring
to a diviner who is able to communicate with ancestors-everyday discourse uses the two terms
interchangeably. Many inyangas also claim spiritual authority for their medicinal powers and often
sangomas will use traditional medicine or muthi. AsHFORTH, supra note 2, at 52-53, 54.
13. Id. at 295; Jasper Raats, People's Medicine, MAIL & GuARDiAN (South Africa), Apr. 26, 2005
(estimating 200,000 traditional healers in South Africa).
14. Claire Keeton, Sangomas to Join Formal Medical Fraternity, SUNDAY TuMEs (South Africa), May
9, 2004, at 4. This figure, commonly repeated, has been questioned. See AsIFORTH, supra note 2, at 51.
15. PETER GEsCmERE, THE MODERNITY OF WrrCHCRAFr: PoLMcs AND THE OCCULT IN POSTCOLONIAL
AFRICA 22 (1997) ("[I]t is ... a basic tenor to these discourses that they explain each and any event by
referring to human agency.").
16. AsHFoRTH, supra note 2, at 10, 17.
17. Id. at 18; Comaroff & Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at 541.
18. Witchcraft Suppression Act 3 of 1957, as amended by Act 50 of 1970. On the colonial roots of
the statute, see CHANOCK, supra note 5, at 326. See also Cape of Good Hope Act 24 of 1886; Witchcraft
Suppression Act of 1895.
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no hard evidence.' 9 Many Africans therefore view the Act as an unjust attempt
to deny and denigrate a central aspect of their traditions.2 ° Some have called for
the law to be replaced with new legislation.
Now Parliament has taken a bold step toward occult regulation. The Tradi-
tional Health Practitioners Act of 2004 establishes a state agency tasked with
overseeing traditional healers.21 The Act directs the agency to screen out
illegitimate healers, to license legitimate ones, and to punish the unauthorized
practice of traditional medicine. Apparently, the idea is to bolster order and
stability by reducing the need for citizens to resort to lawlessness in order to
protect themselves against sorcery. For the first time, the government can claim
that it is providing a state-sanctioned defense against bewitchment. Critically, it
has achieved this by moving national policy away from culture-blindness and
toward the sort of accommodation of traditional beliefs demanded by move-
ments like Africanization.
Prominent proposals for additional legislation would draw the state further
into combating witchcraft itself. Several of these proposals grew out of a
government inquiry into witchcraft violence. The African National Congress
(ANC) established a commission on occult-related violence in one of its first
governmental acts after coming into power in 1994.22 The Ralushai Commis-
sion, as it came to be known, conducted an investigation and ultimately
proposed a Witchcraft Control Act that would subject suspected witches to
criminal arrest, prosecution, and trial in state courts.23 That proposal gained
force in 1998, when the Commission on Gender Equality, an agency of the
national government, held a conference on witchcraft violence that was attended
by prominent leaders including then-Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. Delegates
to the conference largely endorsed the Ralushai Commission's proposal to
19. Hund, supra note 4, at 368 ("Anyone brought before the courts for practising witchcraft is set
free for lack of concrete evidence.").
20. See AsHFoRTH, supra note 2 at 265; Niehaus, supra note 4, at 107; N.V. Ralushai, Summary of
the Ralushai Commission Report, in WrrcHcRA.Fr VioLENcE AND THE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 2,
at 124, 127.
21. See Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 s. 4(1). In 2006, the Constitutional Court
invalidated the Act, along with three other statutes, on the ground that certain legislators had not
followed adequate procedures for facilitating public involvement. See Doctors for Life Int'l v. Speaker
of the Nat'l Assembly and Others, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399, at *169-70, 177, 189 (CC); see also id. at
*175 (noting that the Traditional Health Practitioners Bill had generated "huge interest"). The court
gave Parliament eighteen months to re-enact the legislation, during which time the Act would remain in
place. Id. at 189, 196. Recently, Parliament introduced a new Bill, the text of which is identical to that
of the 2004 Act. Traditional Health Practitioners Bill, 20-2007; see also id. Memorandum on the
Objects of the Traditional Health Practitioners Bill s (1)(b)(iii) (resolving that the text of the 2004 Act
would serve as the text for the 2007 Bill); Wendy Jasson da Costa, SA Consults China, India on
Traditional Medicines, CAPE TIMEs (South Africa), July 5, 2007. Passage appears likely.
22. N. V. RALUSHAI ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO WrTCHcRAFr VIOLENCE AND
RrruAL MuRDERs IN THE NORTHERN PRovINcE OF Tm REPUBLuc OF SoUTH AFRICA 1 (1996); see also
Comaroff & Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at 514.
23. RALustiA Er AL., supra note 22, at 54-55, 61 (recommending the criminalization of witchcraft);
Niehaus, supra note 4, at 108 (describing the Ralushai Commission's recommendation).
[Vol. 96:183
WITCHCRAFT AND STATECRAFT
criminalize witchcraft.24 Although the idea has yet to be enacted, certain steps
have already been taken toward state policing of supernatural offenses.25
Neighboring Zimbabwe recently banned bewitchment. 26 In 2006, lawmakers
passed a statute that outlawed the use of practices "commonly associated with
witchcraft., 27 Courtroom evidence of witchcraft now may be given by experts,
presumably including traditional healers,28 who have long been subject to
regulation there.2 9 The BBC took the new law as "another sign that Zimbabwe's
government is continuing to move away from Western values and placing more
emphasis on the country's own traditions. 3 °
How do South Africa's efforts to accommodate African witchcraft traditions
cohere with the liberal political tradition? This Article argues that the regulation
of traditional healers can be endorsed by liberals-provided the 2004 Act is
amended in one critical respect-but that going further and criminalizing
witchcraft itself would too deeply entwine the state in a particular religio-
cultural tradition, seriously straining principles of equal citizenship and the rule
of law. Getting this right is of critical importance both to the legitimacy of
democracy in southern Africa and to the character of worldwide liberalism.
The argument unfolds in six parts. Part I, which defines and describes
witchcraft beliefs and practices, also explains why liberals should remain
agnostic on the question of witchcraft's reality. Part II lays out the Article's
theoretical orientation. Liberal democracy is the political form that South Africa
has adopted-that much is uncontroverted. In order to understand how recent
occult-related laws relate to the liberal tradition, this Article starts with the
framework of John Rawls, an orientation that it selects for good theoretical
reasons. Yet it also suggests that Rawls's theory of political liberalism should be
compromised at critical points, and it accepts arrangements as consistent with
liberalism that Rawls himself would have rejected.
Parts III through V evaluate three governmental strategies toward the occult
from the perspective of liberalism. Part III endorses common law accommoda-
24. Harnischfeger, supra note 2, at 61. The Hund volume purports to be a collection of papers first
read at the 1998 conference. John Hund, Preface to WrrcucRAlr VIOLENCE AND a LAW IN SOuTH
AFRICA, supra note 2, at 7-8; cf. COMMISSION ON GENDER EQUALITY, THE THOHOYANDOU DECLARATION ON
ENDING WrrCHCRAFr VIOLENCE (Sept. 10, 1998), available at http://70.84.171.10/etools/newsbrief/1999/
news0325, at 2, 3-4 [hereinafter THOHOYANDOu DECLARATION] (endorsing the recommendations of the
Ralushai Commission while not explicitly urging criminalization of occult attacks).
25. The South African Police Force formed an Occult-Related Crimes Unit to train officers who
handle forensics at witchcraft-related crime scenes. Devil Busters Go Bust?, MAIL & GUARDIAN (South
Africa), Mar. 19, 1999. Although the unit mainly investigates attacks on suspected witches, some police
officers have investigated allegations of witchcraft. Niehaus, supra note 4, at 99.
26. Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act 23 of 2004 §§ 97-102 (Zimbabwe) (effective July 1,
2006); see also Steve Vickers, Witchcraft Ban Ends in Zimbabwe, BBC NEWS, July 2, 2006.
27. Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act 23 of 2004 § 98(1) (Zimbabwe).
28. Id. § 98(4).
29. See Traditional Medical Practitioners Act 38 of 1981 (Zimbabwe); Traditional Medical Practitio-
ners Act 14 of 2002 (Zimbabwe).
30. Vickers, supra note 26.
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tion, a practice through which courts have long eased punishments for witchcraft-
related crimes, but it warns that the judicial practice alone may not do enough to give
Africans a sense of equal citizenship. Part IV then defends the Traditional Health
Practitioners Act on liberal grounds, contingent on one amendment: Parliament should
make the law's licensing scheme permissive, not mandatory, so that dissenting
healers--those who disagree with agency determinations-may practice without a
license. Part V contends that outlawing witchcraft itself would risk too much damage
to core commitments and ought to be strenuously resisted. Jailing accused witches
would appear capricious to many citizens, not least some accused sorcerers, and thus
would weaken the rule of law, among other values. The Article concludes by warning
that if liberal democracy is to retain its attractiveness and legitimacy outside the West,
it must not only accept certain accommodations of majority traditions but also reject
those that push beyond its limits.
31
I. WITCHCRAF" AND HEALING
A. WHAT IS WITCHcRAFr?
Witchcraft can be difficult to define, largely because beliefs and practices
surrounding the occult vary from place to place. Even within a single commu-
nity, beliefs are not typically organized into a coherent system. Still, the term
retains a measure of conceptual coherence in practice. I propose the following
definition, which I believe many Africans would accept: A witch is a human
being who secretly uses supernatural power for nefarious purposes. Witchcraft,
then, is the practice of secretly using supernatural power for evil-in order to
harm others or to help oneself at the expense of others.32
Three features are critical to understanding witchcraft beliefs. First, sorcery is
thought to be practiced in secret.33 Unlike American Wicca, African witchcraft
is not a faith that people openly profess. Rather, it is a second-order term of
accusation or suspicion. Anxiety over secret wrongdoing is stoked by the belief
that occult practitioners are invisible, operating at night or in the shape of
familiars.34 People who somehow do witness an act of sorcery are often said to
suffer amnesia.35 Some believe that bewitchment happens subconsciously, so
31. I owe the phrase "the limits of liberalism" and similar formulations to conversations with John
Comaroff.
32. Cf Ashforth, supra note 9, at 126 ("Witchcraft in the South African context typically means the
manipulation by malicious individuals of powers inherent in persons, spiritual entities and substances to
cause harm to others."); AsmoRTH, supra note 2, at 12; E.E. EvAs-PrTcHAP.D, WrrcHc.Ayr, MAGIC,
AND ORACt s AMONG THE AZANDE 1 (1976). Not only does this definition resonate with the academic
literature, both classical and contemporary, but it also reflects my personal experience of common usage
in South Africa.
33. GEscmIE, supra note 15, at 22 ("By definition, witchcraft is practiced in secret .....
34. RALusHAI ET AL., supra note 22, at 57 ("The most vexing problem surrounding witchcraft is that
the activities of a witch cannot be witnessed by naked eyes."),.
35. ISAK NiEnAus, WrrcjicRAFr, PowER, AND PoLmcs: EXPLORING THE OCCULT IN THE SouTH AIucAN
LowvFELD 111 (2001).
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that the perpetrator may not even know whether he or she has directed unseen
forces against others.36 A witchcraft defendant in Cameroon told the court that
he could not say whether he was culpable because, as he put it, "I am not
God.",37 However, an accused witch will sometimes confess, an act that is
considered the surest sign of guilt.
38
A second feature is that witchcraft is a form of human rather than divine
action. Witches are not spirits or gods but ordinary mortals who act against their
victims out of mundane motivations such as jealousy or revenge.39 Occult
forces are themselves supernatural, yet they are always directed by humans.40
For instance, occult medicine, or muthi, is occasionally said to have inherent
agency in the sense that spiritual power works within it.41 Yet it is always set in
motion against its victim by some mortal actor.42 Witchcraft therefore is rightly
considered a worldly injustice even though it involves otherworldly forces.
Third, witchcraft is invariably wicked.4 3 Witches are believed to act out of
jealousy, or to further their own success at the expense of others, or even out of
an inherent craving for causing harm.44 Generally witches are accused of
36. RALtJSHAI ET AL., supra note 22, at 4; cf CHANOCK, supra note 5, at 324 (discussing findings of an
expert who was uncertain whether witches were "conscious of their doings as witches." (citing HENRI
JUNOD, THE LIFE OF A SOUTH AFRIcAN TRIBE (1912)); EvANs-PRrrcHARD, supra note 32, at 58 (assuming
"a possessor of bad teeth [considered similar, but not identical, to witches] injures people's possessions
without malice and perhaps also without intent").
37. GESCHIERE, supra note 15, at 78; see also EvANs-PR1Tc1RD, supra note 32, at 61 (noting that in
certain circumstances "a man might well be a witch and yet not know that he is one").
38. See, e.g., Asm'oRTH, supra note 2, at 259 ("Nothing satisfies the demand for justice in cases of
witchcraft as much as confession."); NtEHAus, supra note 35, at 116 ("Confessions ... were the most
authoritative evidence of witchcraft."); RALusHA Er AL., supra note 22, at 19 (recounting a case of
confession). A complex relationship exists between confession and the belief that people may practice
witchcraft without knowing it. Evans-Pritchard surmised that people unaware of their guilt may
nevertheless perform a ritual confession, perhaps in order to soothe social tension or because they doubt
their own innocence. EvANs-PRrrcHARD, supra note 32, at 59-60.
39. AsH ORH, supra note 2, at 70.
40. GESCHIERE, supra note 15, at 22 ("[I]t is ... a basic tenor to these discourses that they explain
each and any event by referring to human agency.").
41. AsFIORTH, supra note 2, at 139.
42. There is an interesting tension between the universal belief that witchcraft is the product of
human volition and the more occasional idea that it is practiced subconsciously. Evans-Pritchard, in a
classic discussion; remarked that the beliefs of the Azande in this regard were simply "inconsistent."
EvANS-PtrCHARD, supra note 32, at 57. People in that society firmly believed that witches were
conscious agents. Yet when accused sorcerers were unable to recall performing the acts of which they
are charged, sometimes they would conclude that they had acted without awareness. Id.
43. According to Ralushai, a witch is "a person who is believed to be endowed with powers of
causing illness or ill luck or death to the person that he wants to destroy." TRuTH AND RECONCILATON
COMMISSION, 6 TRuTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SouTH AFRICA REPORT, § 1, ch. 3, at 333
(2003), available at http://www.info.gov.zalotherdocsl2003/trcl [hereinafter TRC REPORT] (quoting
Ralushai testimony); see also EvANs-ParrcHARD, supra note 32, at 1, 18; Monica Hunter Wilson, Witch
Beliefs and Social Structure, 61 AM. J. Soc. 307, 307-08 (1951).
44. EvANS-PRITcHARD, supra note 32, at 13-14 (defining moloi as someone who "destroys property,
brings disease, or misfortune, and causes death, often entirely without provocation, to satisfy his
inherent craving for evil doing"). Evans-Pritchard's account, which observes that witches often strike
randomly out of inherent evilness, contrasts with some others, which stress instead that although
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attacking people within their spheres of intimacy like family members or
neighbors.45 They are said to employ various forms of harmful magic, including
potions, lightning, familiars, and zombies.46 Although they may use occult
forces for seemingly innocuous purposes-such as to fly from Pretoria to Cape
Town in a single night or to travel to Johannesburg on a slice of brown bread,
using a spoon to steer4 7-nevertheless these acts of magic ultimately serve
malicious objectives.48
Accused witches can be young or old, though they are generally not children,
and they can be men or women, although women are generally thought to
outnumber men.49 Some ethnographers have found that people suspected of
witches always act wrongly or illegally, they do not attack without cause. A classic study found that
witches attacked those with whom they had quarreled. Those who were on good terms with their
neighbors would have no reason to fear witches. Wilson, supra note 43, at 308.
45. See ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 70-71.
46. RALusHAi Er At., supra note 22, at 15, 18-21.
47. Id. at 23.
48. Anthropologists working elsewhere in Africa have warned against too easily associating witch-
craft with immorality. GEscHIERE, supra note 15, at 12-13. English and French terms for witchcraft,
according to this scholar, carry a moralizing connotation that is not present in corresponding African
words. Id. at 194-95. Occult forces, they say, can be used for good as well as for evil-for instance, to
protect oneself from danger or else to succeed in work or love. Id. at 13. Two responses should dispel
these concerns. First, Western terms like witchcraft and sorcellerie, along with whatever moralistic
connotations they may carry, are commonly used by Africans themselves. Id. at 14. For that reason,
virtually every serious writer on the subject employs the Western terms as well. Second, the English
term witchcraft does in fact seem to refer exclusively to nefarious uses of occult power (at least in
southern Africa if not elsewhere on the continent). Now admittedly occult forces can work both to harm
people and also to heal them, and so ambiguity does pervade this discourse. Whether protecting one's
wife against seducers by giving her a medicine that will purportedly cause any adulterer to waste away
constitutes healing or sorcery may depend on one's perspective. See David Simmons, African Witch-
craft at the Millenium: Musings on a Modem Phenomenon in Zimbabwe, 7 1. INT'L INST. 1, 2 (2000),
available at http://www.umich.edu/iinet/journal/vol7no2/simmons.htm. Nevertheless, a fairly clear ana-
lytic distinction separates the evil manipulation of those forces, called witchcraft, from their use for
healing or defense, which is referred to as traditional healing. See also NmEAus, supra note 35, at 17,
26, 31 (suggesting that before 1960 the term witchcraft was morally ambiguous in South Africa, but
that today there are only two discrete categories: evil witches and good healers).
African terms for witch can correspond imperfectly with the English word in other ways as well. In
northern provinces, for instance, "witch" translates to several non-Western terms, including muloyi
(Venda), moloi (Northern and Southern Sotho, Setswana), and noyi (Tsonga). See RALusHAi ET AL.,
supra note 22, at 4; see also Niehaus, supra note 7, at 191 (defining the Northern Sotho term moloi).
Some of these signify only people who inherit occult ability from their mothers and not those who
acquire it, while others include both. Niehaus, supra note 7, at 191; RALusHAi FT AL., supra note 22, at
14-15. Yet again although the equivalence is not perfect, the English term witch is commonly used by
Africans alongside African terms.
Finally, this Article's definition blurs a classic distinction between witches and sorcerers. E.E.
Evans-Pritchard first drew this distinction, which was meant to separate out those who have inherited
supernatural powers, or witches, from those who actively learn forms of magic and potion-making,
namely sorcerers. See EvANs-PRrrcHARD, supra note 32, at 1; Wilson, supra note 43, at 307. Although
the difference between these two has some currency among academics and intellectuals, it does not
appear to be common in everyday discourse in contemporary South Africa and therefore it is not
observed here. Cf. GEscHmRE, supra note 15, at 225 n.1 (using terms "witchcraft" and "sorcery"
interchangeably).
49. RALUSHAI Er AL., supra note 22, at 14, 58.
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casting spells tend to be elderly, poor, or otherwise marginalized within their
societies. 50 But others have observed exactly the reverse: that witchcraft accusa-
tions target elites who are suspected of having used occult power to achieve
their success.5' One aspect of the tradition seems fairly certain: White people
are not accused of practicing witchcraft, nor are they victimized by it.
52
Belief in the occult is widespread. Africans comprise some seventy-five or
eighty percent of the population of South Africa,53 and among them fear of the
occult is commonplace. This is true even among people who also observe
Christianity.54 The Ralushai Commission reported that "belief in witchcraft is as
prevalent as ever" and it "form[s] part of a basic cultural, traditional, and
customary principle of Africans in South Africa and Africa as a whole., 55 That
report has been criticized for faulty scholarship, 56 but here its conclusion is not
particularly controversial. Witchcraft beliefs are not limited to a particular
economic class, to rural areas, to non-professionals, or to older generations, but
instead are widely (although perhaps not evenly) held across contemporary
Africa.57 Recognition of these beliefs therefore may well impact the legitimacy
of democratic experiments in southern Africa.
Modernization and democratization do not seem to have weakened occult
convictions. 58 On the contrary-and fascinatingly-violence against witches
exploded after the transition to democracy in South Africa began. By one
estimate, for example, 676 suspected witches were killed in Limpopo Province
alone in the first half of 1996, the year the final constitution was adopted.59 By
50. Niehaus, supra note 4, at 113-14.
51. ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 97-100 (recounting the story of Moleboheng, whose mother was
accused of using witchcraft to obtain a house that actually was built with money supplied by
Moleboheng); GESCHIERE, supra note 15, at 5. Jean and John Comaroff resolve the tension by saying
that suspects are often "people of conspicuous, unshared wealth and undue influence" but that "it is old,
defenseless females who tend to be attacked" because the rich and powerful are difficult to reach.
Comaroff & Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at 525.
52. RALuSHAI ET AL., supra note 22, at 23-24. But see Simmons, supra note 48, at 3 (reporting one
case of a white victim of alleged bewitchment in Zimbabwe).
53. See South African Government Information, The Land and Its People, available at http:I/
www.info.gov.za/aboutsa/landpeople.htm#population. •
54. See Bishops Warn Priests Against Witchcraft, INDEP. ONLINE (South Africa), Aug. 16, 2006
(reporting that the South African Catholic Bishops Conference had warned priests against combating
witchcraft by calling on ancestors); Worshipping the African Way, INDEP. ONLINE (South Africa), Dec.
21, 2006 (describing one instance of blending of beliefs in Christianity and in witchcraft).
55. RALUsHAI Er AL., supra note 22, at 57; see also Gordon L. Chavunduka, Notes on African
Witchcraft, in WITCHCRAFr VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN SouTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 136, 137
(confessing his own belief in witchcraft); Leo Igwe, A Skeptical Look at African Witchcraft and
Religion, 11 SKE'rnc 72, 72 (2004).
56. Niehaus, supra note 4, at 94-95.
57. See JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN COMAROFF, MODERNITY AND rrs MALcoNTENTs: RiTuAL AND POWER IN
POsTcOLoNIAL AFRICA xxv (1993); Hund, supra note 4, at 384 (concluding from admittedly unscientific
research that about eighty percent of southern African students believe in witchcraft, regardless of sex,
age, ethnicity, or level of formal education).
58. See CoMARoFF & CoMAROFF, supra note 57, at xxv; GEscHIERE, supra note 15, at 2.
59. See Comaroff & Comaroff, Reflections on Liberalism, supra note 3, at 467 n.7 (citing Northern
Provinie Targets "Witch" Killers, MAIL & GUARDIAN (South Africa), Sept. 27, 1996).
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another, 146 occult-related deaths occurred there during the last ten months of
1996.60 Ethnographic accounts since that time have suggested that there may be
a witchcraft "epidemic."61 Even when suspicions do not break out into violence,
they affect ordinary lives in quotidian but still powerful ways, leading people to
worry that enchanters will attack them, their families, or members of their
communities.62
B. TRADITIONAL HEALERS
Traditional healers treat physical and mental ailments by harnessing the same
occult forces that witches use, but for good rather than evil-to defend against
supernatural harm and sometimes even to retaliate against witches themselves.63
The term traditional healer only recently replaced the colonial phrase witch
doctor. Many Africans supported the change because they felt that the older
term wrongly associated healing with witchcraft-a connection that they found
insulting-and because they felt that the colonial term harkened back to a
general disrespect for African traditions.64 The new term, however, has difficul-
ties of its own. Chiefly, the adjective "traditional" evokes an unchanging
timelessness, when in fact many contemporary healers are modem figures who
embrace technology, dress in business suits, drive luxury automobiles, and
continually develop new techniques. These sangomas and inyangas innovate
freely, dispensing substances that often have little connection to ancient wis-
dom.65 Yet the new term arguably remains appropriate to the degree that it
signifies that healers still ultimately derive their power from relationships with
the ancestors.66
Older academic literature conventionally described two types of healers:
herbalists or inyangas and diviners or sangomas. Herbalists specialize in tradi-
tional medicine (muthi), while diviners enjoy clairvoyant powers and. have a
more spiritual aura.67 (Interestingly, herbalists' medicines are now being studied
60. Witchcraft in South Africa, supra note 8. Another source indicates that at least 389 suspects were
killed between 1985 and 1995 but that figure is likely to be vastly understated. See Niehaus, supra note
4, at 105.
61. See Ashforth, supra note 9, at 122; see also ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 255 ("Hardly a week
passes in South Africa without press reports of witches being killed or of mutilated bodies being found
with organs removed for purposes of sorcery."); Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 9, at 779 (noting
that belief in zombies had reached "epic, epidemic proportions").
62. AsHFoRTH, supra note 2, at 66 (describing how, although public action against witches is rare,
accusations nevertheless circulate through everyday types of discourse such as gossip).
63. Like witchcraft, however, traditional healing carries some moral ambiguity. See supra note 48
(discussing the moral quality associated with witchcraft).
64. See ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 138-39; Jerome Cartillier, Sangomas Revel in New Status, MAiL
& GuARIAN (South Africa), Sept. 10, 2004.
65. See AsHpoRTm, supra note 2, at 59, 296 (describing "the general innovation featured by
successful healers").
66. See id. at 295; Hund, supra note 4, at 386 ("In order to cure people it is necessary to enter the
world of the ancestors.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
67. See ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 52-53; Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, National
Council of Provinces, Report of the Select Committee on Social Services on Traditional Healers 6
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by the government as an effort to better appreciate the efficacy of indigenous
knowledge systems.68 ) Diviners enjoy the unique ability to detect witchcraft,
according to one conventional account. 69 Newer ethnographic evidence, how-
ever, suggests that the distinction between these two types is not sharp in
ordinary parlance. Many sangbmas use traditional medicine, particularly when
treating members of the public for a fee, and virtually all inyangas claim
ancestral or supernatural authority for their healing power.70 Everyday discourse
therefore uses the two terms almost interchangeably. 7 Some distinctions argu-
ably remain, such as that only sangomas participate in drumming and dancing
rituals. 72 But for most practical purposes the two terms are synonymous and are
covered by the English term traditional healer.
Markets for traditional healing are vibrant today. According to the National Depart-
ment of Health, again, some eighty percent of the population consults traditional
healers.73 Other government officials have estimated that eighty-five percent of Afri-
can households74 and between sixty and eighty percent of African communities
75
patronize inyangas or sangomas. Parliament's Select Committee on Social Services
reported that 350,000 traditional healers are practicing today, as opposed to 250,000
Western doctors.76 And according to an influential report by the monitoring group
NGO Traffic, one-third of health care services in the province of KwaZulu-Natal are
based on indigenous medicine.77 In the nation as a whole, more than 27 million
people are reported to use traditional medicines.78 To be sure, many of these figures
fall short of scientific certainty. What does seem certain, however, is that many South
Africans regularly seek treatment from traditional healers. And because those healers
function largely to protect against witchcraft, their popularity also indicates the
ubiquity of witchcraft beliefs.
(1998) [hereinafter Report of the Select Committee on Social Services]. Other African terms are the
Sotho ngaka and Xhosa igqirha, though inyanga and sangoma are the most commonly heard in national
media and politics. See ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 52.
68. See generally Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge (Feb. 24, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 890657.
69. Anthony Minnaar et al., Witch Killing with Specific Reference to the Northern Province of South
Africa, in VIOLENCE IN SouTm AFRICA: A VARIETY OF PERSPECTIVES 175, 182-83 (Elirea Bornman et al.,
eds., 1998).
70. "The powers underpinning virtually every kind of nonmedical healing in South Africa derive
from personal relationships with ancestors and other spiritual beings." ASsnFORTH, supra note 2, at 294.
Even fees are often decided according to relationships with invisible beings. See id. at 297.
71. See Asr'ORTH, supra note 2, at 55-56, 292. Terms in Sotho carry no distinction between
herbalists and diviners. NiEHAtiS, supra note 35, at xiii.
72. These drumming rituals are central to the ngoma cult. See AsHFORTH, supra note 2, at 55-56.
73. Report of the Select Committee on Social Services, supra note 67, at 3; see also Keeton, supra
note 14. This figure, commonly repeated, has been questioned. See ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 51.
74. Niehaus, supra note 4, at 106 (quoting RALUSHA ET AL., supra note 22, at 48-49).
75. Report of the Select Committee on Social Services, supra note 67, at 3.
76. Id.
77. Raats, supra note 13 (discussing the findings of NINA T. MARSHALL, SEARCHING FOR A CURE:
CONSERVATION OF MEDICINAL WILDLIFE RESoURCES IN EAST AND SouTHERN AFRICA (NGO Traffic 1998)).
78. Id.
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C. WITCHCRAFT AND INJUSTICE
Because witchcraft discourses attribute adversity to the wrongful acts of other
citizens, they transform ordinary misfortune into a matter of justice. Some
influential Africans therefore think the government has a responsibility to
address occult violence in just the same way that it protects people against
physical violence.
Witchcraft works like a theodicy-it explains misfortune and answers peren-
nial human questions: Why are we suffering? Why us? Why now? 79 Traditional
belief in sorcery answers these questions by attributing hardship to the malevo-
lent actions of another.80 According to this view, any seemingly natural afflic-
tion can ultimately be attributed to a hex, muthi, zombies, or the like. When
ordinary troubles occur with extraordinary ferocity, in noticeable patterns, or in
a strange manner, people begin to suspect an underlying occult cause. 8' Light-
ning bolts, for instance, are commonly credited to sorcery, as are automobile
crashes and illnesses. Of course most everyone understands that pneumonia is
caused by a virus. But that superficial explanation leaves open the question of
deeper malice: What caused the virus to strike this particular person at this
particular time? Moreover, supernatural accounts function not only to explain
but also to evaluate. They provide a moral vocabulary that people use to ask and
answer fundamental questions about evil.82
Occult interpretations have the potential to explain not only natural calamities
but also social and political misfortunes. Loss of popularity, being fired from a
job, or even failing to win an election can be ascribed to witchcraft. Although
some reportedly believe that every affliction is the result of enchantment, 83 this
sort of determinism is far from universal. Nevertheless, much social adversity is
loosely linked to the occult. As the leading ethnographer of daily life in
contemporary Soweto put it, "[i]n a world of witches, all conflicts have an
occult dimension., 84
D. POLICING WITCHCRAFT
Currently, the perceived injustices caused by witchcraft are redressed, if at all, by a
rough hodge-podge of public and private authorities-a situation that has left most
Africans dissatisfied and that has intensified calls for legislative action.
79. See Ashforth, supra note 9, at 127; EVANs-PRrCHARD, supra note 32, at 18 ("[Tihe concept of
witchcraft provides [Azande people] with a natural philosophy by which the relations between men and
unfortunate events are explained .... ).
80. ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 10; EvANs-PrrcHARD, supra note 32, at 1.
81. See RALusuAi Er AL., supra note 22, at 58.
82. Steffen Jensen & Lars Buur, Everyday Policing and the Occult: Notions of Witchcraft, Crime,
and "the People," 63 AFP. STUD. 193, 193 (2004) ("The occult is, in other words, a moral language, as
well as a practical ideology .... ). For a classic account of witchcraft discourse as a language of
values, see Wilson, supra note 43, at 309; see also EvANs-PRrrCvARD, supra note 32, at 18.
83. See Igwe, supra note 55, at 74; see also Minnaar et al., supra note 69, at 180.
84. AsHFORTH, supra note 2, at 313.
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Government has the authority to police witchcraft under the Witchcraft
Suppression Act of 1957. 8 5 That law, which has its roots in colonial-era
legislation that aimed to stamp out the practice altogether, criminalizes virtually
all witchcraft-related conduct, including accusing anyone of practicing witch-
craft, engaging in divination techniques designed to detect witches, and the
practice of witchcraft itself.86 Critically, the 1957 Act effectively prohibits all
forms of private policing because it bans divination, which is the only recog-
nized technique for detecting witches. And the prohibition against witchcraft
accusations makes trying witches virtually impossible. For instance, one woman
was brought before a kgoro (traditional court), where she was accused of
causing lightning to strike a neighbor. The court expelled her from the village.
Later, the villagers who had accused her of casting spells were themselves tried
in state court and charged with violating the 1957 Act.87 As a result of that law
and other social factors, traditional tribunals that once adjudicated accusations
of witchcraft have ceased to operate.8 8
In theory, the Act might be read to compensate for its ban on customary
courts by asserting a governmental monopoly over the policing of sorcery itself.
Yet in practice, the anti-witchcraft provisions of the Act are seldom enforced.
Police have refused to investigate and prosecute suspected witches because of
difficult problems of proof: How is it possible to root out a suspect who
operates in secret and cannot be detected without assistance from the ances-
tors? 89 Police have sometimes arrested witch accusers but more often they have
avoided local disputes, acting only to the extent necessary to protect accused
witches from physical harm (and often not even to that extent).90
What results is perhaps the worst possible combination of government poli-
cies from the perspective of many Africans: On the one hand, traditional
techniques of resolving witchcraft disputes have been outlawed, while, on the
other hand, those seen as committing acts of occult aggression have escaped
both governmental and traditional punishment. During apartheid, many people
inferred from this combination of policies that the government had sided with
witches and was even relying on them to bolster its power. Citizens still view
the Witchcraft Suppression Act as an unjust remnant of colonial law that badly
denigrates African religion and culture. 91
In the absence of police protection and traditional courts, various private
actors have taken up the struggle against witchcraft. Chief among these actors
85. Witchcraft Suppression Act 3 of 1957, as amended by Act 50 of 1970.
86. Id.
87. RALUSHAI Er AL., supra note 22, at 136. The accusers were ultimately acquitted.
88. Hund, supra note 4, at 387.
89. See AsHFoRTH, supra note 2, at 314.
90. See Niehaus, supra note 4, at 99.
91. See, e.g., RALUSHAI Er AL, supra note 22, at 54 ("This Act is regarded by the traditional courts as
a very unjust piece of legislation, because its aim is not to punish witches, but those individuals who
name others as witches."); see also Ralushai, supra note 20, at 127.
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are young militants--or "comrades" as they are known-who may spontane-
ously and informally assemble in large groups to hunt down and punish
suspected witches.
Often witch hunts by these young activists have a political character. During
the anti-apartheid struggle, young militants sought to punish people whom they
suspected of killing fellow protesters by means of nefarious enchantment.92 In
2000, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) granted amnesty to
more than thirty young people who had been convicted of murder and other
crimes in connection with witch killings in the early 1990S.9 3 Under the
statutory standard for granting amnesty, an applicant's crime had to be politi-
cal-it had to have been "associated with a political objective" and it must have
concerned "conflicts of the past."94 The TRC Amnesty Committee found that
several young militants had indeed acted to further political aims. 95 Chiefs had
effectively formed a tier of local government at the time and had been closely
aligned with the apartheid regime. Traditional leaders "were perceived by the
youth to be a front for the South African Government, '' 96 and in fact had helped
to administer the apartheid regime at the local level.9 7 In some cases, victims of
witch hunts were directly involved in government and were overtly opposed to
the liberation movement.98 The Amnesty Committee held that liberation forces
had "used cases of witchcraft . . . to politicise communities." 99 It found a
prevalent belief among those who "sought democratic change" that traditional
authorities had used witchcraft for counter-democratic purposes.t °° Failure of
92. See TRC REPORT, supra note 43, at 41.
93. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Amnesty Committee Decision, Application in Terms
of Section 18 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, In re: Nndwamato
Amos Muhadi and 39 Others 6 (2000), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2000/
ac20094.htm [hereinafter TRC Amnesty Committee Decision]; see also TRC REPORT, supra note 43,
§ 1,ch. 3.
94. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, § 20(l)(b) (requiring, inter
alia, that a TRC amnesty application concern a crime that was "associated with a political objective
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past").
95. TRC REPORT, supra note 43, at 40. The TRC conclusion that these witch hunts were politically
motivated is contestable. Much of the evidence shows only that the killers used vague political
language and that they associated their victims with the apartheid regime in some way or another while
also claiming that they had been involved in witchcraft. At the very least, their motives were complex.
96. TRC Amnesty Committee Decision, supra note 93, at 4; see also TRC REPORT, supra note 43, at
333 ("Apartheid legislation had largely transformed traditional leaders into political functionaries who
were seen not only as corrupt and self-serving but also as lackeys of the apartheid regime.").
97. TRC Amnesty Committee Decision, supra note 93, at 4-5.
98. See, e.g., id. at 6 (describing a case where the suspected witch came from a prominent family
that was affiliated with the apartheid regime-the man had repeatedly interfered with meetings of
supporters of the liberation movement). In the Magoro case, however, the Committee indicated only
that the suspected witch had some sort of government affiliation. Id. at 15 ("The deceased held a
leadership position connected to government.").
99. Id. at 41.
100. Id. at 4-5. The TRC seemed to think that this was a finding of the Ralushai Commission.
Presumably it received that impression from Prof. Ralushai's testimony. It wrote: "It seems that it was
one of the findings of the [Ralushai] commission that the chiefs in general did believe in witchcraft.
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authorities-traditional and governmental alike-to prosecute suspected witches
had fed a belief that the government was protecting witches.''
Today, students still lead campaigns against witchcraft-though their objec-
tives are not always as overtly political as in the past. For instance, in February
2005 three teenage soccer players were killed when their pickup truck over-
turned on the way home from a match outside their village in the northern
province of Limpopo.10 2 Community members blamed their deaths on witch-
craft. Later that day, some one hundred young people rampaged through the
village torching the homes of suspected witches.10 3 By the time the police
arrived, twenty-nine houses had been burned to the ground. Targets included
chiefs and headmen, Christian pastors, and African traditional healers. Police
officers arrested over one hundred youths and formed two task forces to address
the burnings. The mayor of the village warned that "[a] lot of the villagers still
believe in witchcraft. There is talk that the people want to kill the witches."
'' 4
Gangs of young people operate not only in the countryside but also in urban
areas like the Johannesburg township of Soweto. 10 5
Although a great many Africans fear witches, they do not always welcome
protection by the youth. Some community members regard young comrades as
heroes, but others view their uncontrolled prosecution of witches as a dangerous
threat to law and order and to the authority of elders. 10 6 Probably the majority
worries that young militants are punishing sorcerers in a lawless manner.
10 7
Few other actors have the power to combat perceived occult aggression,
however. Traditional authorities occasionally punish occult wrongdoing even
though their central anti-witchcraft techniques are illegal under the Witchcraft
Suppression Act. Chiefs and headmen interact in complex ways with local
police, comrades, and other private authorities such as the church.10 8 Some
evidence suggests that state officials have referred witchcraft disputes to tradi-
Coupled with this, was the bona fide belief in the area that the chiefs were associated with ritual
murders which flowed from witchcraft." Id. at 5. However, the claim that chiefs were seen to use
witchcraft to bolster their political authority does not appear in the final version of the Ralushai
Commission Report. Only one short paragraph addresses the role of traditional leaders in witchcraft
activity, and it only finds that chiefs were associated with the apartheid state and that they therefore
"became a target of the now politicized youth." See RALusHAI ET AL., supra note 22, at 49; see also TRC
REPORT, supra note 43, at 40 (relying on a similar passage in the Ralushai Commission's interim
report). It does not support the assertion that chiefs were seen to bolster their political power by occult
means.
101. TRC REPORT, supra note 43, at 41.
102. Govender, supra note 10, at 8.
103. Police Arrest 90 After Limpopo "Witch-Hunt," MAIL & GUARDIAN (South Africa), Feb. 25,
2005.
104. Govender, supra note 10, at 8.
105. See AsHFORTH, supra note 2, at 243-48 (recounting a mob killing of a suspected witch in
Soweto).
106. See NMEHAus, supra note 35, at 151-52.
107. See RALusHm ET AL., supra note 22, at 15, 30, 51.
108. On the role of the church in combating witchcraft, see Worshipping the African Way, supra note
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tional leaders.'0 9 The inverse has also occurred: Traditional authorities have
handed accused conjurers over to state authorities, often for their own protec-
tion. 110 Non-state entities also interact with one another entirely apart from
government involvement. Chiefs, for instance, have asserted themselves against
young militants with varying degrees of confidence, depending on the strength
of their political alliances with other civic actors.'
Empirical accounts do not support the supposition that democratization will
bring more consistent enforcement of uniform laws without regard to religion or
culture. On the contrary, available evidence suggests the opposite-that tradi-
tional authorities are becoming increasingly involved in adjudicating witchcraft
disputes, and that customary techniques of detection are blending with state
legal apparatuses in more open ways.11 2 The existing patchwork of state and
non-state enforcement of anti-witchcraft norms has satisfied few. It has put
serious strain on democratic commitments to the rule of law, to security of the
person, and to an undifferentiated citizenship. As a consequence, popular calls
for government intervention have intensified-leading to the 2004 Healers Act
and to further proposals for the criminalization of witchcraft itself.
E. WITCHCRAFT AND LIBERALISM
How might liberal democrats think about the problem of occult injustice?
Some will suggest that it is not necessary to consider difficult questions of
whether and how to regulate occult practices because witchcraft does not exist.
On this view, government ought not act in the realm of the imaginary because it
has no business accommodating or even cognizing majority beliefs that are
plainly mistaken. Of course the state may and should enforce general laws
109. Take the case of Elisa Boloka, who went to the police after a woman and her daughter came to
Boloka's home and accused her of bewitching the daughter. A prosecutor investigated and, having
decided not to pursue the case, referred Elisa Boloka to a tribal court. RALusIta Er At., supra note 22, at
129 (citing magistrate court records from 1995 and also noting that the prosecutor did not possess the
authority to refer the case to a tribal court). In another case dating from 1994, a woman accused two
other villagers, Annah Sebola and Annah Lhaka, of being witches and threatened to take them to a
witch doctor to prove the charge. Id. at 144. When community members assembled to discuss the
situation, they decided that there was no evidence of witchcraft and that the accusers should be reported
to the police. However, the prosecutor declined to pursue the matter, which he instead referred to a
tribal court. Id. at 145 (again reiterating that the prosecutor lacked the power to do so).
110. For instance, Wilheminah Mokgawa allegedly accused another person of going to a witchdoctor
to learn how to bewitch others. When the accused complained to the local headman, the headman
directed her to the police. Subsequently, Wilheminah Mokgawa was arrested, tried, and ultimately
acquitted of leveling an accusation of witchcraft in violation of the Witchcraft Suppression Act. Id. at
126 (relying on judicial records from 1993).
111. One new chief bolstered his authority by joining the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), the most
powerful Christian sect in the area and one of the largest and fastest-growing in the nation. He held
revivalist meetings at his residence and appointed senior members of the ZCC as advisors in his court.
In this way, he succeeded in shoring up his newfound authority to the degree that he was able to take
stronger positions against accusations of witchcraft and to establish his court as the primary forum for
adjudicating conflicts over occult activity. See AsHioRTH, supra note 2, at 186.
112. See Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 197-98 (describing ways in which state officials
have increasingly accommodated occult beliefs and practices).
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against murder and the destruction of property in the context of occult prac-
tices-as in all other contexts-but it should hesitate to go further because
occult beliefs are false."
3
Others may take exactly the opposite approach: If witchcraft is real, then
government ought to treat occult aggression identically to physical aggression
and assert a monopoly over its legitimate policing. A democracy should not
hesitate to implement the will of the strong majority of the people, who wish to
be protected against harm by wrongdoers so that they can feel secure and may
pursue their private ends free of fear for their safety.11 4 Many Africans treat the
occult not as the object of belief, but as a matter of knowledge. 1 5 Crediting
their worldview would entail outlawing supernatural harm.
On either of these views, government should tailor its policies to its position
on the reality of witchcraft. But liberal democrats take a different approach:
They cultivate neutrality on the question of witchcraft's reality, just as they seek
to remain neutral with respect to other religious and cultural convictions.
Exemptions from drug laws for Native Americans who use peyote in sacred
rituals, for instance, would not be rejected (or implemented) for the sole reason
that the Native American belief in the spiritual efficacy of peyote was deemed to
-be false (or true)." 6 Similarly, Prohibition-era laws that allowed Catholics to
use wine in communion, despite the general ban on alcohol, would not have
been condemned (or lauded) on the ground that the Catholic belief in transubstan-
tiation was wrongheaded (or sensible)." 7 Examples like these could be multi-
plied-more than 2,000 statutes in the United States accommodate religious
beliefs in similar ways. 18 South Africans could decide whether to accommo-
date witchcraft convictions using similarly neutral rationales.
Some South African leaders, including a few non-Africans, do say that
government ought to embrace the reality of occult powers and legislate accord-
ingly. For instance, John Hund, a law professor at the University of South
Africa, argues that because witchcraft is real, fines ought to be imposed on
people found guilty of practicing it.'1 9 Likewise, Africanists sometimes advo-
cate the criminalization of witchcraft by maintaining that occult forces are not
in fact imaginary. 120 Presumably many others deny that witchcraft exists and
113. I owe this point to participants at the New York Junior Faculty Colloquium at Fordham Law
School, where I presented this Article in draft form. See also Mavhungu, supra note 2, at 116-17 (citing
examples of witchcraft denials).
114. I am grateful to Brian Tamanaha for raising this possible perspective in a private conversation.
115. My thanks for this point go to John Comaroff, who raised it in an e-mail message.
116. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2000).
117. See National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, Title II, § 6, 41 Stat. 305, 311 (1919).
118. Michael McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 5 (2000)
(including both state and federal statutes in the 2,000 figure).
119. Hund, supra note 4, at 388 ("There is ... reason to believe ... that African witchcraft is
something real and not just imaginary. State enforcement of a Western world view which denies the
reality of African witchcraft has not worked, and is not the answer.").
120. RALusiLm Er AL., supra note 22, at 61 ("The reason for bringing any of these practitioners
within the scope of the criminal law is that the practice of witchcraft, and of witch-finding, do actually
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oppose any occult-related legislation on that ground.
Liberalism is designed to manage just this sort of dissensus on fundamental
questions of religious, philosophical, and moral ontology. Its solution is to
remove the state from questions of ultimate reality, so that political control of
the government does not become synonymous with control over the religious
and cultural life of the citizenry. 21 Democracy of that sort lowers the stakes of
conflict over political control so that the group in power is not also able to
impose its comprehensive views. That does not mean, however, that the state is
prohibited from accommodating the beliefs of a large majority of the people. So
long as it can do so without violating the rights of dissenters or other principles
of justice, it is permitted (and sometimes required) to protect private commit-
ments concerning matters of ultimate value. In fact, modem democracies do so
all the time.
II. LIBERALISM IN AFRICA
This Part begins by explaining why it makes sense to adopt a liberal
standpoint-chiefly because that political form was almost certainly adopted in
the 1996 constitution. It then justifies the choice of a Rawlsian starting-point,
explaining why Rawls's theory of political liberalism offers a defensible frame-
work for the limited project of this Article. Yet it also cautions that Rawls's
theory cannot be applied rigidly. Certain solutions that political liberalism
would reject can and should be seen as consistent with African liberalism-even
as other firm limits to that form of democracy are drawn and defended.
Liberalism is widely thought to characterize the underlying political approach
of the post-apartheid constitutional democracy. Framers of the 1996 constitution
surveyed the basic laws of several liberal democracies-particularly Canada,
Germany, India, and the United States-as well as the major post-war interna-
tional human rights instruments. 122 It adopted many of these: Familiar provi-
sions include those establishing a bill of rights, separation of powers, judicial
review, popular sovereignty, and equal citizenship. The Preamble envisions "a
democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the
people and every citizen is equally protected by law" and "a society based on
democratic values, social justice, and fundamental human rights."1 23 Section 1
constitutes "one, sovereign, democratic state" founded on liberal-democratic
principles including "[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms," "[n]on-racialism and non-
cause death or injury."); id. at 56 ("[N]o one can now argue that witchcraft is a myth ... 
Chavunduka, supra note 55, at 137 ("It is... true that some people become sick or die as a result of
witchcraft .. "). I describe these views in detail below in Part V.
121. JACOB T. LEVY, TiH MULTICULTURALISM OF FEAR 30-31 (2000).
122. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Religion, Culture, and Liberal Democracy in South Africa 196 (2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author) (describing how the
religious freedom provision borrowed from such sources).
123. S. AFi. CONST. 1996 pmbl.
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sexism," and "[slupremacy of the constitution and the rule of law."' 12 4 Although
it was not always clear during the transition that framers would place their
charter so squarely in the liberal tradition-the interim constitution of 1993
stood in some tension with it-nevertheless today there is little doubt that the
final constitution of 1996 implements basic principles of liberal democracy.
What this Article sets out to discover is the extent to which government
regulation of occult practices conforms to those basic values. Do startling
measures like the 2004 Act adapt liberalism to conditions of post-colonial
religious and cultural pluralism in ways that are defensible from within that
political tradition?
This Article sets out to answer those questions, as an initial matter, by
reference to Rawls's theory of political liberalism-a choice that needs to be
justified.1 25 In order to assess how occult-related laws relate to the liberal
tradition, it is helpful to begin with some prominent account of what liberalism
requires. Rawls's later work does not offer the only plausible choice, or even
necessarily the best one. But his theory of political liberalism does provide one
defensible framework for evaluating tensions between self-rule and cultural
pluralism. Whatever the independent attractiveness of his theory-something I
question below-it doubtless stands among the leading interpretations of liberal
democracy in the West. What's more, it has strongly influenced theorists of
multiculturalism, many of whom have criticized Rawls at different points but
virtually all of whom stand in some relationship, however fraught, to his theory.
Admittedly, South African constitutional actors may not have understood them-
selves to be implementing Rawlsian liberalism-in fact, they almost certainly
have had conflicting allegiances to that account and even to liberalism gener-
ally. But the object of this Article, again, is not only to assess whether these
actors have obeyed their own political-theoretical commitments. Rather, it
adopts a more global perspective, from which it aims to evaluate the ways in
which lawmakers there have interpreted or extended the liberal political tradi-
tion generally. In that way, this Article's project is self-consciously comparative.
Yet even if Rawls's philosophical system provides a defensible starting-point,
it cannot rigidly control the assessment of laws regulating occult-related prac-
tices. This Part argues that African liberalism ought to be able to accept certain
practical measures that pure Rawlsians would otherwise reject as violating
specific ideals of political liberalism. Section A begins by outlining Rawls's
theory as it relates to these questions.
Section B then acknowledges certain critiques of Rawls from prominent
religionists and multiculturalists. Subsequent parts go on to evaluate witchcraft-
related laws from the perspective of that political form, but the Article does not
insist on a philosophical coherence that is unlikely to be achieved in the context
of African democracy-if it is possible in practice anywhere. Of course diffi-
124. Id. § 1.
125. I owe much in this paragraph to a conversation with Robert Tsai.
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culty inevitably arises whenever an ideal theory gets applied to actual political
practices. Yet although compromises to political liberalism can be expected any
time that theory is operationalized, the Part ends by laying out good reasons to
think that a more serious, first-order adjustment is required. 26 Obviously that
larger claim cannot be fully defended in this Article, which instead simply
suggests its possibility. It then focuses on the second-order problem of how well
or badly specific laws and policies cohere with core liberal commitments. That
problem can be addressed independently of the larger question of whether the
encounter with African traditions reveals a more fundamental difficulty with
political liberalism. This Article's only essential claim is that if liberal democ-
racy is to have a future in South Africa, it must be willing to strike workable
compromises on particular policies in order to maximize overall adherence to its
values.
A. POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND PUBLIC REASON
Rawls begins by asking, "How is it possible for there to exist over time a just
and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by
reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" 127 Implicit in this
question (and explicit elsewhere) is a factual assumption that citizens in any
modem democracy will be divided by permanent and irreconcilable differences
over fundamental worldviews. 128 Rawls's challenge in the face of that diversity
is to articulate a political conception that is capable of supporting a just and
stable government. 
129
Rawls's initial answer is simple. He thinks that reasonable citizens must
recognize that they share the political order with others who hold views on
fundamental questions that are at once different from their own and reasonable.
Having understood the fact of pluralism, members of the polity should not
advocate government coercion based on any one comprehensive conception, not
even their own, because they ought to understand that such a system would be
unstable and unfair. 130 From this basic answer, Rawls spins out his vision of
political liberalism.
Five distinctions seem to me to characterize his solution. First, he differenti-
ates between comprehensive and political doctrines. Comprehensive doctrines
guide all of a person's life and contain the whole truth, while political doctrines
are tailored to a realm where divergent comprehensive doctrines interact. While
people run their lives according to comprehensive visions of the good, they
nevertheless are capable of adapting those doctrines to the realities of difference
when thinking about politics. Political doctrines therefore should be designed to
126. Again, I am indebted to Robert Tsai for this insight.
127. JoHN RAWLS, PoLrncAL LBERALISM xxxvii (expanded ed. 2005).
128. Id. at 216-17, 441.
129. KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 120 (1995).
130. RAWLS, supra note 127, at 135.
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be accessible independent of any particular religion, philosophy, or moral
system. 131 Previous liberalisms--of Kant and Mill for instance, but also Rawls's
own prior theory of justice as fairness-were comprehensive.1 32 They advo-
cated forms of liberalism that were incompatible with other comprehensive
doctrines that might reasonably exist in democratic societies, especially reli-
gious ones. 133 Realizing this, Rawls sets out to formulate and defend a liberal-
ism that is political, not comprehensive. As he puts it at one point, "[t]here is, or
need be, no war between religion and democracy.,
1 34
Second, Rawls distinguishes between liberal and nonliberal theories and
advocates the former. Political liberalism is liberal in the sense that it sets out to
solve the problem of pluralism by articulating a political conception of justice
based on the priority of certain rights enjoyed by all citizens. 35 Many reason-
able comprehensive doctrines held by citizens will be nonliberal, he realizes.1
36
Members of some religious communities, for instance, hold a view of divine
authority that does not tolerate or respect individual freedom of conscience.
What Rawls seeks to achieve is a democratic order that will be acceptable to
these doctrines, if only on the political level. 
137
Third, Rawls limits the scope of political liberalism to the basic structure of
society. 138 On questions that pertain-to it, Rawls imagines a political conception of
justice that is freestanding of any particular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or
moral view but nevertheless able to win agreement of all such reasonable concep-
tions--an overlapping consensus. 139 This political conception does set out moral
ideals but it strives to articulate moral ideals that all reasonable citizens can accept
regardless of their fundamental differences of conscience. A liberal political concep-
tion of justice can win an overlapping consensus once citizens adopt its principles
from within their own comprehensive doctrines.' 40
131. Id. at 223, 452-53; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in Is MULCULTURALISM
BAD FOR WOMEN? 105, 110-11 (Joshua Cohen et al., eds., 1999).
132. RAwLs, supra note 127, at xxxvii, xl, 486.
133. Robert B. Talisse, Rawls on Pluralism and Stability, 15 CRrrcAL REV. 173, 174-75 (2003).
Enlightenment liberalism was secular, too, whereas political liberalism does not mandate secularism or
take any position on fundamental questions of religion. RAwLs, supra note 127, at xxxviii, 486.
134. RAwLs, supra note 127, at 486.
135. Id. at xlvi, 223, 450.
136. Id. at xlv.
137. Rawls recognizes that there will also be many reasonable political conceptions of justice-
many liberalisms-but these various liberalisms will be united by the need to satisfy the criterion of
reciprocity. Id. at 450; see infra note 274 and accompanying text. Justice as fairness is only one of these
possible liberalisms. Id.
138. Id. at xli. Rawls defines "basic structure" to mean "a society's main political, social, and
economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one
generation to the next." Id. at 11. Elsewhere he uses somewhat different formulations, saying for
instance that limitations on comprehensive doctrines should apply only to constitutional essentials, and
to matters of basic justice. Id. at 214, 227, 229 n. 10. Apparently these phrases are equivalent.
139. Id. at 134.
140. See id. at 482 ("[I]t is central to political liberalism that free and equal citizens affirm both a
comprehensive doctrine and a political conception.") (emphasis added).
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So a political conception is not adopted merely because it is workable under
certain political conditions, but also because it is independent of fleeting
political circumstances. That sort of principled agreement will lead to deeper
unity and more lasting stability. 14 ' A group of citizens will not withdraw its
support if contingencies change and it turns out that the group now has the
political might to impose its view of the whole truth on others. Rather, a
political conception of justice that is capable of achieving lasting stability-and
this is Rawls's fourth distinction-must be an overlapping consensus and not "a
mere modus vivendi."'
4 2
Fifth and finally, political liberalism only aims to attract reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines that carry reasonable political conceptions. What is reasonable-
ness? Rawls devotes much thought to this question.1 43 I will mention only one
central feature of reasonableness-the criterion of reciprocity. Rawls's idea is
that citizens should promote political values that they reasonably expect other
citizens could reasonably endorse. 1" Terms of social cooperation are fair and
reasonable when citizens offering them "reasonably think that those citizens to
whom such terms are offered might also reasonably accept them." 145 This
reflects Rawls's initial intuition that reasonable people will recognize the fact of
pluralism and act accordingly, at least in the political sphere.146 Public reason is
the style of argument that reasonable citizens will adopt when formulating a
political conception of justice for the whole society.
Rawls struggles with the idea of public reason and writes about it in at least
three different places. 147 He contrasts it to non-public reasons, which are not
meant for governance of the society as a whole, but instead are reasons used by
churches, universities, professional organizations, and other associations.1
48
141. Rawls was deeply concerned with unity and stability in his later work. See, e.g., id. at xxxvii,
xlvii.
142. Id. at 218, 147-48; Talisse, supra note 133, at 187-88.
143. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in RAWLS, supra note 127, at
440-90.
144. See RAWLS, supra note 127, at xlviii, 253, 446.
145. Id. at xlii; see also id. at 446.
146. A comprehensive doctrine without a reasonable political conception, by contrast, is itself not
reasonable. Id. at 59.
147. See id. at xlviii (in the introduction to the paperback edition, written in 1995); id. at 223 (in
Lecture VI, The Idea of Public Reason § 4, first delivered in 1990); id. at 440 (in the essay The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited (1997)).
148. Id. at 215, 220; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 129, at 108. Rawls avoided the term private
reason because he believed that political conceptions of justice could apply also to the so-called
"private." True, public reason applies only to what he called "the public political forum," and not to
background culture or civil society. RAWLS, supra note 127, at 443. So obviously, public reason should
govern in legislatures, political campaigns, and judicial reasoning. But also, less obviously, public
reasons should guide citizens' voting. Id. at 215. Therefore Rawls is concerned not simply about public
or open reasoning, but also about quite intimate decisionmaking. Id. at xlviii, liii, 444-45; GREENAWALT,
supra note 129, at 111. He therefore rejects the distinction between public and private, at least as that
differentiation is conventionally understood. See RAWLS, supra note 127, at 220 n.7 (no private
reasoning); id. at 470-71 (no private sphere).
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Originally, Rawls thought that comprehensive commitments ought to play no
role in public reasoning.' 4 9 After debating the matter with other thinkers, he
later modified that view and allowed that reasonable comprehensive doctrines
could be invoked in politics, but only if they were ultimately redeemed with
public reasons. 5' But his basic idea remained unaltered-namely, that the
legitimacy of a democracy is closely related to its ability to offer public reasons
for its basic arrangements. A political conception is legitimate if and only if
citizens advocating it can offer reasons to support it that they think might
reasonably be accepted by other citizens.' 51 Civility likewise means that citi-
zens have the duty to be able to explain to other citizens how their actions on
fundamental questions can be justified by "political values of public reason."' 152
One implication of these five distinctions for thinking about religious diver-
sity and multiculturalism is that government should not decide basic questions
on the basis of a religious, philosophical, moral, or cultural conception that is
specific to an individual or group. 153 Rawls says at one point "there is no reason
why any citizen, or association of citizens, should have the right to use state
power to decide constitutional essentials as that person's, or that association's,
comprehensive doctrine directs., 154 Under the criterion of reciprocity, "no
citizen could grant to another person or association that political authority.'
' 55
For example, a Christian legislator could not give solely theological reasons to
explain his or her support for a particular bill because that legislator could not
reasonably expect that non-Christian people could reasonably accept those
justifications. And African traditional leaders could not impose a ban on witch-
craft on the sole ground that occult harm is real, because people who reject
African traditional beliefs (and yet might be subject to the law) could not accept
that reason. More generally, members of religious or cultural groups should not
seek to govern according to principles that make sense only within that group's
worldview. I think of this prohibition on governance according to any particular
tradition as a rule of religio-cultural anti-establishment.
B. CRITIQUES OF PUBLIC REASON
Rawls's political liberalism has been criticized both by religionists and by
multiculturalists. Both critiques bolster the view that it is not necessary to reject
settlements concerning African traditions simply because they do not satisfy the
criterion of reciprocity or otherwise qualify for inclusion in an overlapping
consensus.
Scholars of religion have tended to focus on Rawls's requirement of public
149. See RAwLS, supra note 127, at 223, 224-25.
150. He referred to this exception as "the proviso." Id. at xlix-1, 453.
151. Id. at xliv, 217,446-47; see also JEFFREY STOUT, DEMoCRACY AND TRADMON 65 (2005).
152. RAwLS, supra note 127, at 217.
153. Id. at 460.
154. Id. at 226.
155. Id.
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reason, which excludes a wide range of religious reasons from playing any
significant role in public life. Jeffrey Stout, a leading scholar of religion, thinks
the primary difficulty is that Rawls's criterion of public reason is itself an idea
that reasonable people could reasonably reject. 15 6 Citizens know that society
includes a diversity of comprehensive doctrines, but it does not follow that they
will elect to offer only public reasons that they think reasonable people could
not reasonably reject. Rawls imputes unreasonableness to anyone who opts out
of the project of public reason, as he defines that term. So someone who rejects
the very idea that legitimacy depends on the ideal of agreement could count as
unreasonable. 157 Stout's objection is that many reasonable people in a democ-
racy-particularly religious people-will reject the idea that a just and stable
order depends on a common justificatory basis for government.158 He predicts,
in other words, that the quest for agreement on a political conception of justice
is not likely to meet with success. 15 9 Nor should it. Reasonable people can and
will reject the project of seeking common principles that could form a consen-
sus of any sort, including an overlapping one. Citizens can be reasonable, on
this view, without appealing to a free-standing conception of justice. Isn't it
possible, Stout asks, to imagine a (relatively) just and stable democratic order
without any sort of reasonable consensus?
Rawls's prohibition on offering religious reasons for legislation or voting
strikes Stout as counterintuitive and odd in a society that values freedom of
expression.' 6° Moreover, imposing that requirement could have undesirable
effects. Stout worries that religious people who think Rawlsian reasonableness
is an accurate description of what democratic culture requires will see it as a
reason to withdraw from that culture. 161 He thinks that is already happening in
the U.S.: Traditionalists who reject liberalism are becoming dominant in reli-
gious communities. And Stout may well be correct that political theorists do not
see this as clearly as scholars of religion, who are closer to the nation's pulpits.
The danger that traditionalists will reject a liberal democracy that they think
does not welcome their reasoning in public life is a real concern not only in the
U.S. but even more so in Africa.
Kent Greenawalt, another leading scholar in the area, likewise questions the
necessity and feasibility of agreement on a broad ideal of public reason.162
Fairness and stability are rightly prized by Rawls, he says, but they might be
achievable without entirely excising religious arguments from political life,
156. STOUT, supra note 151, at 66-67.
157. Id. at 67.
158. Id. at 67-68.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 68.
161. Id. at 75.
162. GREENAWALT, supra note 129, at 120. However, he does think that public political discourse
with those that hold different comprehensive commitments can and should not rest on religious reasons.
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLInCAL CHOICE 216-17 (1988).
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especially where citizens trust and respect one another. Greenawalt argues that
any consensus on constitutional essentials will necessarily be quite abstract. 163
What is more, people's interpretation of constitutional essentials will often be
influenced by their comprehensivecommitments. Their judgments will not be
limited to what public reason would allow, but instead will be "infused by their
transcendent perspectives."''64 He thinks that is unavoidable and acceptable:
There is no compelling reason why people should reach interpretations of
essentials that conform only to public reason, even when their comprehensive
doctrines would suggest another understanding.
Stout and Greenawalt argue, each in his own way, that excluding all compre-
hensive views from political life is quixotic, needless, and unappealing.1 65 If
these critiques are generally persuasive, as I believe they are, then liberal
democrats ought to remain open to at least some practical-political settlements
that do not qualify for inclusion in an overlapping consensus simply because
they do not conform to the Rawlsian ideal of public reason.
Multiculturalists, like religionists, have resisted the ideal of public reason.
Prior to their work, much liberal theory had assumed that law ought not to
cognize religious, cultural, ethnic, or other ascriptive group identities as a
matter of justice. 166 Extending ideas developed in the context of the American
civil rights movement, liberals conventionally had believed that democracies
ought to remain blind to a wide variety of identity characteristics that were
thought to be morally irrelevant to law. Just as government should avoid
discriminating on the basis of race, so too it should avoid classifying citizens
along lines of religion or culture. The first wave of multiculturalism argued to
the contrary that questions of religio-cultural pluralism deserve a central place
in normative political theory, especially liberal theory, and further that certain
protections for traditional cultures are permitted and even required as a matter
of right.167 Questions surrounding language policy, the rights of indigenous
peoples, special representation for ethnic minorities, and exemptions for reli-
gious exercise were taken to be of genuine interest for philosophy. 8 Will
Kymlicka has led the movement, showing that Rawls's liberal theory insuffi-
ciently appreciated the plurality of cultures that characterized many modem
163. GREENAWALT, supra note 129, at 114-15.
164. Id. at 117.
165. For a related critique that addresses not just religious comprehensive doctrines, but utilitarian-
ism as well, see Talisse, supra note 133, at 239.
166. See Jacob T. Levy, Contextualism, Constitutionalism and Modus Vivendi, in MULnCULTURALIsM
AND POLITICAL THEORY 19 (Anthony Laden & David Owens eds., forthcoming Oct. 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=851906; see also WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 4
(1991) [hereinafter KyMUSCKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE]; WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CIzENsHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINorrY RIGTrrs 3-4 (1995) [hereinafter KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CmzmrsiP] (stating that liberals believed in a "separat[ion] of state and ethnicity"). I rely heavily on
Jacob Levy's thoughtful work on multiculturalism throughout the remainder of this section.
167. Levy, supra note 166, at 19.
168. Id. at 1.
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democracies. 169 He contends that minority cultures that wish to place internal
restrictions on their members-such as bans on apostasy, internal proselytizing,
and public education of children-will not be able to argue for those restrictions
if they must observe the restrictions on public reasoning that are central to
Rawls's political liberalism. 170 "Many religious communities," he concludes,
"would object to political liberalism on its own terms, as a theory of citizen-
ship."' 17 ' Distinguishing between political and comprehensive liberalism will
not appease religious groups because political liberalism is just as hostile to
certain nonliberal groups as is comprehensive liberalism. 172 Kymlicka ends up
arguing for a comprehensive liberalism that guarantees the individual rights of
internal dissenters173-but not without the hope that his more robust form of
liberalism can win a consensus of reasonable citizens, as opposed to a contin-
gent majority. But what matters here is that certain multiculturalists, like some
leading religionists, think that strict Rawlsian liberalism is unworkable in
practical situations of extreme religious and cultural variegation.
If liberal democracy is to work in southern Africa, it must be willing to
compromise on matters such as public reason, the criterion of reciprocity, and
the need for an overlapping consensus. Recent theorists have been particularly
critical of the ideal of an overlapping consensus-and they have shown in-
creased appreciation for the power of contingent, modus vivendi solutions to
complex problems of group conflict.' 7 4 Second-wave multiculturalists have
turned their attention away from ideal theory and toward specific political
contexts, arguing that actual practices in socially differentiated democracies are
not likely to satisfy the requirements for inclusion in an overlapping consensus-
yet that those settlements between democracy and tradition may nonetheless be
relatively stable and fair. 1
75
My sense is that difficulties presented by laws concerning the occult are not
169. KYMrtcKA, LBERALiSM, CoMMuNIry, AND CuLTuRE, supra note 166, at 137-52; see also KyM-
LICKA, MuLTCULTURAL CmrNsfm', supra note 166, at 128-29, 158-63.
170. KyMucKA, MuLTcuLTuRAL CrrnzF'sHI, supra note 166, at 160-61.
171. Id. at 231 n.8.
172. Id. at 164 ("The fact that Rawls's theory is less comprehensive does not make his theory more
sympathetic to the demands of non-liberal minorities.").
173. See id. at 165 ("I believe that the most defensible liberal theory is based on the value of
autonomy, and that any form of group-differentiated rights that restricts the civil rights of group
members is therefore inconsistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality.").
174. Joseph A. Carens, A Contextual Approach to Political Theory, 7 ETtucAL THEORY & MORAL
PRAc. 117, 130-31 (2004) (explaining why the institutionalization of normativity is not necessarily
desirable in culturally variegated societies); Bernard P. Dauenhauer, A Good Word for Modus Vivendi,
in THE IDEA OF A PoLmcAL LIBERALISM 204 (Victoria Davison & Clark Wolf eds., 2000); Levy, supra
note 166, at 26; Claudia Mills, Not a Mere Modus Vivendi, in THE IDEA OF A PoLmcAL LmERALISM 190
(Victoria Davison & Clark Wolf eds., 2000) (criticizing Rawls's narrow view of modus vivendi
solutions as temporary and suggesting the possibility of more permanent modus vivendi solutions);
Talisse, supra note 133.
175. Levy, supra note 166, at 1-2, 20. Of course someone might object that ideal political liberalism
is not workable in practice anywhere-not even in Western democracies-because it is designed to
solve problems on the level of philosophy rather than of practical politics. Whatever the truth of this
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* likely to be resolved on the level of first-best political liberalism. 176 Evaluating
those laws must proceed on a lower level of abstraction. 7 7 That is not to say
that liberal theory should not play a role in evaluating new laws. The remainder
of the Article draws on liberal theory to evaluate particular policies from the
perspective of liberal democracy. What it resists is the imperative to reject a
political compromise between liberal democracy and African tradition simply
because it fails to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity or otherwise cannot qualify
for inclusion in an overlapping consensus. It will argue for example that the
Traditional Health Practitioners Act of 2004 meets minimum requirements of
liberal justice (with one important caveat) even though the Act would violate
any political conception capable of winning an overlapping consensus. Yet the
method followed here is also capable of identifying normative limits. Criminal-
ization of witchcraft, for example, is incompatible with liberal democracy even
as a second-best solution.
III. COMMON LAW ACCOMMODATION
In one way, government has long accommodated witchcraft beliefs without
compromising basic liberal principles. For years, South African criminal courts
have eased punishments on Africans who committed crimes because of a
sincere belief in the occult.' 78 Judges have taken witchcraft beliefs into account
under general categories of criminal law-for instance, by ruling that the
defendant was operating under a mistake of fact or by finding that the beliefs
constituted an extenuating circumstance that could be considered at sentenc-
ing. 179 In other words, courts have used this technique to recognize African
claim, it is nonetheless compatible with the approach here, which only highlights the degree of
difficulty satisfying Rawlsian conditions in an African context.
176. By "first-best" I mean ideal from the perspective of political philosophy, untroubled by
practical circumstances such as the existence of actual divisions within a given-society. Cf. Comaroff &
Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at 540 ("[P]ostcolonial nation-states cannot but live with
both sides of an unresolvable equation. ); AssHoRT, supra note 2, at 17 (describing a similar
conundrum).
177. Cf. RAwLs, supra note 127, at lix (explaining that his theory is meant to address philosophical
questions of the more general kind).
178. See S v Phama 1997 (1) SACR 485 (EC) at 487 (S. Afr.) (describing a long history in South
Africa of mitigating sentences when the accused came from a "primitive society steeped in supersti-
tion"); As-FORTH, supra note 2, at 259; RALusi~ E AL., supra note 22, at 57 ("Whereas the witchcraft
motive was previously concealed in evidence as far as possible, as an aggravation in the eyes of the law
bent on stamping it out, it has now become advantageous to rely on it, or even to pretend to believe in it
in order to obtain a more lenient sentence."); Comaroff & Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at
533; Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africa's Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the Future of
Its Customary Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 62, 92 (2003) (noting that courts are willing to mitigate if
the accused "honestly believes the deceased intended to use witchcraft to harm the defendant or his
relations"); Niehaus, supra note 4, at 100 ("Judges often treated the belief in witchcraft as an
extenuating circumstance [in sentencing]."). This common law practice has now been legitimated by
statute in Zimbabwe. See Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act 23 of 2004, § 101 (effective
July 1, 2006).
179. Historically, courts have oscillated between twin desires to civilize indigenous Africans by
severely punishing witchcraft-motivated murders, on the one hand, and to ease punishments for
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witchcraft beliefs and practices within a common legal framework. 180 My sense
is that judicial application of general common law categories to witchcraft-
related activities is best viewed as a purposive exception for African traditions
rather than as the application of one or another general legal category in the
pursuit of formal neutrality or culture-blindness. 18' But regardless of whether
this judicial technique is seen as formally neutral as to religion and culture, it is
defensible in a liberal polity because it eases burdens on African beliefs while
preserving the unity of the rule of law and remaining relatively administrable.
This Part will conclude, however, that common law accommodation may not do
enough to convince Africans that their customs enjoy equal recognition and
dignity. 1
82
A. THE TECHNIQUE IN PRACTICE
Naledzani Netshiavha, twenty-five years old and newly married, was living in
a house that he had built next to the homes of his two brothers. 83 One night, he
and his wife California were awoken by a scratching sound at the door to their
home. They arose and noticed a large bat hanging from the rafters. 184 Naledzani
swung an axe at the creature, landing a blow that caused it to fall to the ground.
He and his wife then ran next door to alert his brother. On the way, they saw
two strange animals traveling down the road.1
85
Joined now by the brother and his wife, the Netshiavhas returned home,
where they saw what looked like a small donkey moving in the darkness at the
edge of the yard.' 86 Naledzani crossed to the animal and struck it with his axe.
It lay still. At that moment, Naledzani's second brother drove up in an automo-
bile. With the help of its headlights, the group could see that the creature lying
on the ground had the head of an adult human and the body of a small child. 1
87
They recognized its face-it belonged to an elderly villager named Jim Nepha-
lama. 188 A traditional leader, the local headman, was summoned. During the
time it took him to arrive, the dead body morphed into the adult Jim Nepha-
defendants who sincerely believed either that they had not killed a human being or that they had
committed murder in order to protect themselves, their families, or their communities from occult
assault, on the other hand. CtANOCK, supra note 5, at 326-27.
180. See LEVY, supra note 121, at 188.
181. For a treatment of this distinction, see Lawrence G. Sager, The Free Exercise of Culture: Some
Doubts and Distinctions, 129 DAEDELus 193, 204 (2000).
182. See LEvY, supra note 121, at 188.
183. See State v Netshiavha 1990 (3) SACR 331 (A) (S. Afr.). The facts of the case are also
reported-with some differences and in somewhat greater detail-in RALusHt Er AL., supra note 22, at
191-92. For other accounts of Netshiavha, see Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 188, 193-95;
Niehaus, supra note 4, at 100.
184. Netshiavha, 1990 (3) SACR at 332.
185. RALustA Tr AL., supra note 22, at 191.
186. Netshiavha, 1990 (3) SACR at 332.
187. Id. at 333.
188. RALusiu Er AL., supra note 22, at 191.
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lama.1 89 Witnesses were astounded by the transformation, but they were not
shocked to learn that Jim Nephalama was a witch, for he had often boasted of
his unusual power over people. 90
Naledzani Netshiavha was arrested and charged with murder.191 After negotia-
tions with the prosecutor, he entered a plea of guilty to the lesser charge of
culpable homicide, saying that he had struck at the victim because he thought
that his target was a bat rather than a human being.1 92 The court imposed a
sentence of ten years' imprisonment. 193
The appeal was heard by Richard Goldstone, a left-leaning jurist who would
later become a noted Justice of the Constitutional Court. Judge Goldstone took
issue with the trial court, which he said "in effect held that the appellant did
intend to kill the deceased and on that basis imposed what is clearly a heavy
sentence." ' 94 But Judge Goldstone could see no ordinary motive for the killing.
All evidence pointed instead to the conclusion that Naledzani Netshiavha had
"what appeared to be a genuine belief in witchcraft." 19 5 He could see no reason
to disbelieve Netshiavha's statement that he had not intended to kill a human
being. 196
Netshiavha had admitted to acting unreasonably when he struck and killed
the strange creature. Judge Goldstone acknowledged this and conceded that
"[o]bjectively speaking, the reasonable man so often postulated in our law does
not believe in witchcraft."'1 97 To that extent, all individuals were to be treated in
the same way. Nevertheless, Judge Goldstone noted that under well-established
law a subjective belief in witchcraft could mitigate the severity of a sentence.' 9 8
Here, a belief in witchcraft offered the only rationale for the killing because
uncontroverted evidence had established that Netshiavha and Nephalama were
189. Gideon Netshiavha was "shocked" to see that the body had transformed into a normal adult.
Netshiavha, 1990 (3) SACR at 333.
190. RALusHAi ET AL., supra note 22, at 192.
191. Netshiavha, 1990 (3) SACR at 332.
192. Id. (In support of that plea, he submitted a written statement which read in part: "I deny that I
unlawfully and intentionally caused the death of the said John Nephalama Gumani [sic].... I plead
guilty to culpable homicide in that I unlawfully and negligently caused the death of the said deceased. I
had mistaken the deceased to be a bat and it was only later that I realized that what I had struck was a
human being.").
193. Niehaus, supra note 4, at 100.
194. Netshiavha, 1990 (3) SACR at 332.
195. Id. at 333.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. The full passage reads:
Objectively speaking, the reasonable man so often postulated in our law does not belief in
witchcraft. However, a subjective belief in witchcraft may be a factor which may, depending
on the circumstances, have a material bearing upon the accused's blameworthiness. As such it
may be a relevant mitigating factor to be taken into account in the determination of an
appropriate sentence.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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neighbors on good terms.19 9 He therefore reduced the term of imprisonment
from ten years to the four that had already been served.2 ° ° Justice Goldstone
later recalled "I let him go."2 ° t Again, that ruling stands in a long line of cases
accommodating witchcraft traditions through general common law catego-
ries.2 °2
Courts' willingness to accommodate occult beliefs has oscillated over time.
The early years of the transition saw a particularly brutal spate of witch killings.
Judges during that period felt compelled to deter further violence by imposing
strict sentences.20 3 As the democracy matured, however, courts felt freer to
accommodate African traditions.2° In 1995, for instance, the High Court in the
North West Province sentenced five young men who had killed a prominent
villager, Motihabane Makolomakwa. 20 5 They had burned him to death, claiming
that he had murdered their fathers and turned them into zombies. Each was
convicted of murder. At sentencing, the judge considered two mitigating factors:
that the killings had been motivated by "a belief in witchcraft," and that "on the
199. Id.
200. Niehaus, supra note 4, at 100.
201. Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 195 ("In recollecting the case, Justice Goldstone said to
us, 'I let him go."').
202. See, e.g., Rex v Mbombela 1933 A.D. 269 at 275 (S. Afr.) (holding that defendant should not
have been convicted of murder because he was operating under a mistake of fact-namely, that the
victim was an evil spirit-and therefore replacing the murder conviction with a conviction of culpable
homicide, and altering the sentence from death to twelve months' imprisonment); Rex v Fundakubi
1948 (3) SA 810, 821 (A) (S. Afr.) (treating a belief in witchcraft as an extenuating circumstance); S v
Nxele 1973 (3) SA 743, 757 (A) (S. Aft.) (recognizing that sentences for witchcraft-related crimes may
be eased under the general rule of "blameworthiness"); see also Niehaus, supra note 4, at 102
(discussing Rex v. Mbombela).
203. See, e.g., S v Lukhwa en n' Ander 1994 (1) SACR 53 (A) (S. Afr.) (English headnote)
(overturning a death sentence imposed for deterrence reasons). In Lukhwa, the judge observed that
witch hunts had been frequent in the homeland of Venda during 1990-1991 but had since abated. Based
partly on the fact that the crisis had passed and deterrence was no longer as critical, the court commuted
a death sentence for the killing of a suspected sorcerer to life imprisonment. Id. at 54; see also TRC
REPORT, supra note 43, at 333-34. However, the Ralushai Commission Report does not mention any
reduction in witch killings since that period anywhere in the Northern Province. On the contrary, it
stresses the continuing need to combat anti-occult violence. RALusutI Er A.., supra note 22, at i ("The
government was also under pressure to release the report within this short period of time as the
Province continued to burn. Something had to be done, and very fast.") (characterizing the situation
around 1995).
One possible interpretation of Netshiavha is that the court of appeal heard the case later than the trial
court and after the crisis in Venda had eased. But the timing of the appellate decision does not seem to
support that theory, since it was handed down in 1990, when the situation in Venda was near its worst.
Also, the Ralushai Commission did not attribute the trial court's severe judgment to deterrence. Rather,
the Commission argued that the trial judge in Naledzani "did not understand the facts before him...
and simply came to the conclusion that Naledzani should have realized that [the bat-like creature] was a
human being." RALuSHAI Er AL., supra note 22, at 192. What happened on appeal may have as much to
do with the fact that it was heard in Bloemfontein, at some distance from violent witch hunts that had
reached crisis proportions in the former Venda.
204. See Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 196-97.
205. See id. at 184 (reporting data collected from interviews and court records).
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day in question the [defendants] had also drunk liquor."20 6 Today, common law
accommodation is regularly employed, but Africanists have called on courts and
legislatures to do more to fully recognize African traditions.2 °7
B. GENERAL LAW'S INSUFFICIENCY
How should common law accommodation be evaluated from a liberal perspec-
tive? Theorists have identified a tension between, on the one hand, maintaining
social unity and a sense of common citizenship through a uniform legal
structure and, on the other, recognizing distinct religio-cultural commitments in
law. Going too far in either direction can be harmful to the unity and stability of
a pluralistic society. My view is that common law accommodation comports
with liberal principles as far as it goes, but might be supplemented with fuller
measures in order to better promote those principles. The remainder of this Part
defends that position.
1. Preserving Legal Universalism
A great strength of common law accommodation is its legal generality.
Traditionally, many liberals have recoiled against singling out religious or
cultural traditions, considering this a form of discrimination. Neutralists, as I
will call them, think the best approach is simply to extend to each individual
citizen the same set of civil and political rights, without regard to religious or
cultural identity. Citizens have a right not to suffer state discrimination on the
basis of religion or culture, identity characteristics that are morally arbitrary and
ought to remain irrelevant to citizenship. Non-discrimination is the rule for
neutralists not only in the sense that government may not single out members of
traditional groups for special burdens, but also in the further sense that govern-
ment may not target them for special exemptions. One way of thinking about
neutralism is that it requires state disregard of differences of religion or culture-
what Charles Taylor calls "difference blindness. 2 °8 Will Kymlicka similarly
describes this classic liberal position as requiring "benign neglect" of differ-
ence.
20 9
Cognizing religious or cultural traditions is both unnecessary and unattractive
206. Id. The defendants were each sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.
207. See Niehaus, supra note 4, at 103. But see Ingrid Oellermann, Five Life Terms for Witchcraft
"Massacre," MERCURY (S. Afr.), Nov. 16, 2006, at 4 (reporting that a court had imposed a heavy
sentence despite claims that defendants had acted out of a belief in witchcraft).
208. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MuLTicuLTuRALISM AND "THE POLmCS OF
REcOGNMON" 25, 43 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1992); see also Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural
Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105, 109 (1992). For a contemporary proponent of something close to
neutralism, see generally BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE & EQUALITY (2001). For a position close to neutralism
with respect to free exercise doctrine, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Equal
Regard, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 203-04 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000). Sager
has extended aspects of this argument beyond religious freedom to cultural rights as well. See Sager,
supra note 181, at 205-407.
209. KYmucKA, MuLTicuiTuRAL CmZENsmu, supra note 166, at 3.
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for neutralists. It is unnecessary because universal rights to religion, speech, and
assembly already adequately protect people who wish to enjoy their culture or
practice their religion.210 It is unattractive for two reasons. First, privileging
certain religious and cultural groups is seen as unfair. Accommodating members
of one tradition often means disproportionately burdening members of other
traditions or arbitrarily denying them similar rights. For instance, preferential
hiring policies may prevent members of non-preferred groups from being hired
when they otherwise would have been. Even if another group will not be
burdened by an accommodation, its members may think that protecting reli-
gious and cultural groups, but not other social groups, is inherently unfair.
Allowing, say, Rastafarians to use marijuana while prohibiting secular libertar-
ians from doing so is seen as violating basic standards of fairness among
individuals. 211 Second, allowing the government to differentiate among people
based on religious or cultural characteristics is unattractive because it encour-
ages individual citizens to take into account morally irrelevant identity character-
istics in their private lives, which has the effect of dividing the citizenry.
Measures that differentiate in this way are seen as "inherently discrimina-
tory.
212
If they endorsed any measure of cultural recognition, neutralists would favor
common law accommodation, because it maintains the basic universalism of the
criminal law, recognizing African traditions only at the level of interpretation
and application of general rules. Judges reduce sentences for occult-related
crimes only by applying legal concepts that apply to everyone regardless of
religion or culture, such as "culpable homicide," "extenuating circumstance,"
and even "blameworthiness." Easing burdens on criminal defendants by apply-
ing those categories retains the authority of the general legal framework and
risks relatively little division among the citizenry. The constitution aspires to
"non-racialism '21 3 and establishes "One Law for One Nation., 214 Common law
methods of accommodating African traditions do relatively little damage to
those aspirations.
To be sure, some neutralists might oppose the technique out of a suspicion
that courts actually aim to single out. members of African traditions for special
treatment, even if they do so using general legal categories. Presumably, African
tradition worked in Netshiavha's favor in a way that a more idiosyncratic
belief-say, that the victim had taken the form of a space alien-would not
210. See Kukathas, supra note 208, at 107.
211. See KymLicKA, MuLicuTURAL CrZENsiP, supra note 166, at 107.
212. Taylor, supra note 208, at 55.
213. S. AFR CONST. 1996 § 1. Non-racialism is a central commitment of the democracy. See John
Sharp, "Non-racialism" and Its Discontents: A Post-apartheid Paradox, 50 Im'L Soc. Sci. J. 243, 243
(1998) (describing non-racialism as "the official credo of the South African state"); see also Comaroff
& Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at 522 ("The dominant ideological trope in the fight
against the old regime... was 'nonracialism."').
214. See Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 189; Comaroff & Comaroff, Policing Culture,
supra note 3, at 540.
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have. And any such judicial purpose to provide special treatment would pro-
mote, not hinder, segregation in the criminal law. Nevertheless, most neutralists
probably would support common law accommodation. What they certainly
would resist is going further and creating statutory exceptions for African
practices surrounding the occult. That would complicate and balkanize the
criminal law, perhaps even to the point of creating distinct legal regimes for
distinct groups.21 5
2. Avoiding Ossification
Another virtue of applying general legal categories to individual cases is that
it avoids excessive ossification of traditional practices. Determining traditional
beliefs on a case-by-case basis means that they need not become hardened into a
state-run system of customary law. Under the apartheid regime, customary law
was applied by state courts, which rationalized its rules in ways that did not
always allow for evolution. A split developed between "official customary law"
and the system of rules that was actually customary according to the practices of
living African communities-"true customary law" or "living customary law.",
2 16
By contrast, common law accommodation allows traditional beliefs and prac-
tices to evolve free of state systematization. Courts determine the content of
these beliefs only to decide how they might fit doctrinal categories in each
individual case.
3. Individual Dissent
Finally, this longstanding technique permits individual dissent from the tradi-
tions of any particular African group.21 7 Because judges establish the content of
individual beliefs anew in each case, rather than working from a predefined
understanding of customary law, they remain open to idiosyncratic variations on
group beliefs. What matters for the general criminal law is, say, whether the
defendant was operating under a sincere belief in witchcraft, not whether that
belief comported with generally-held views within an African group. Preserving
that sort of individual liberty of conscience is prized by liberal democrats of all
stripes.
4. A Drawback
Common law accommodation's principal difficulty is that it may not go far
enough toward giving African traditionalists reason to feel that they are re-
garded as full members of the political community. Granting certain criminal
defendants some limited sentencing relief risks doing too little to make believ-
ers feel that the state is taking an active role in protecting them from occult
aggression. For certain Africanists-who may form a large sector of the popula-
215. LEvy, supra note 121, at 187.
216. Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 86-87"(S. Aft.).
217. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. Rav. 495 (2001).
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tion-supernatural injustice deserves the same sort of state response as ordinary
criminal injustice does.2 l8 Merely lessening punishments for private citizens
who engage in self-help to protect their communities against enchantment
cannot satisfy them that the government is ensuring individual security, adminis-
tering retribution against wrongdoers, and guaranteeing law and order.219 Al-
though common law accommodation in the criminal law enjoys widespread
support as a necessary minimum of state recognition for traditional beliefs,
many Africans will feel that simply easing punishment of witch hunters does
not sufficiently recognize their traditions. As a consequence, they may not
experience a sense of shared citizenship, but instead may resent police and
government officials who are not allies, and may even be enemies, in the fight
against sorcery.
My conclusion is that this longstanding and widely accepted judicial practice
is rightly embraced as a basic measure by which a liberal democracy can
recognize traditional African beliefs and practices surrounding the occult with-
out seriously compromising the uniformity or stability of the general legal
system. While strict neutralists might complain that the technique wrongly
sensitizes government to religio-cultural identifications, any resulting harm to
equal citizenship has been minimal. If anything, this method has not gone far
enough toward making traditionalists feel valued as equal citizens. Conse-
quently, Africanists have urged Parliament to do more to assure people that the
government is sensitive to their feelings of vulnerability to the occult. Legisla-
tors recently heard their plea and passed landmark legislation regulating tradi-
tional healers.2 2 °
IV. REGULATING TRADITIONAL HEALERS
Traditional healing has long been formally illegal in South Africa. Under the
Witchcraft Suppression Act and its colonial predecessors, divination or so-
221
called white magic is banned along with more sinister occult practices.
Divination, an ancestor-based form of detecting enchantment, lies at the root of
much traditional healing. Outlawing it, therefore, effectively criminalizes virtu-
218. See ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 17-18.
219. See KYMLicKA, MuLTicuLTrRAL CmrzErsm, supra note 166, at 192 (pointing out that refusal to
accommodate traditional beliefs can be destabilizing to a liberal society because it fosters resentment
toward the state). Levy makes a similar argument with respect to the incorporation of indigenous law:
Common law recognition... may well not satisfy the feeling among indigenous peoples that
they ought to be recognized as distinct peoples. It may leave many members of indigenous
communities feeling alienated and distant from a state that does not grant them their due.
Perhaps they will never feel like full citizens in a state which does not fully acknowledge their
distinctive status.
LEVY, supra note 121, at 185-86.
220. See Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 (effective 2005) (S. Afr.).
221. CHANOCK, supra note 5, at 323-24.
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ally all of traditional medicine.222 Other health care laws likewise purport to
outlaw traditional healing. 223 Even though these laws were not historically
enforced against healers, and thus traditional medicine has flourished in prac-
tice," traditional health practitioners have long denounced the expressive
impact of criminal bans.2 25 Practitioners feel that they have been "degraded and
dehumanized" by such laws, which not only communicate state opprobrium, but
also have the effect of associating healers with witches in the eyes of the
public. 26 Healers view their stigmatization as part of a more general denigra-
tion of African culture that persists in the post-apartheid democracy.
Citizens who depend on traditional healers for security against enchantment
also feel unsatisfied with government policy that denigrates the inyangas and
sangomas on whom they depend for protection.2 27 Laws outlawing traditional
healing contribute to a sense of alienation from the criminal justice system,
which seems insensitive to the fact that fear of enchantment is a primary source
of personal insecurity for many Africans.22 8 Dissatisfaction with witchcraft laws
dovetails with growing criticism of the democratic state's failure to adequately
protect communities against various forms of violence. 22 9 In the mid-1990s,
African traditionalists began urging Parliament to address occult beliefs and
practices by recognizing traditional healers. Legislators obliged in 2004 by
passing the Traditional Health Practitioners Act, which aims to license and
regulate African healers for the first time.23 °
How does this startling new law comport with the principles of liberal
democracy? My argument is that the Act harmonizes with that tradition be-
cause, on balance, it does more to promote principles of equal citizenship and
individual freedom of conscience than it does to harm central commitments to
the rule of law. Moreover, it bolsters democratic legitimacy by recognizing a
belief held to some degree by the vast majority of citizens. This Part describes
the genesis and structure of the Act. It then argues that even though the Act
depends on criteria that make sense only from within a particular religio-
222. ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 54, 57, 286.
223. For instance, the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 § 36(d) criminalized the practice of
traditional healing. See ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 286, 298; REPORT OF THE SELTEr COMMn-rEE ON
SocIAL SERvicEs, supra note 67, at 3, 14. The Homeopaths, Naturopaths, Osteopaths, and Herbalists Act
52 of 1974 did the same. See REPORT OF THE SELEcr COMMrrrEE ON SOCIAL SERvicES, supra note 67, at
14. Finally, the South African Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Act 132 of 1998 requires
registration and regulation of all "traditional medicines."
224. See REPORT OF THE SELECr COMMITEE ON SOCIAL SERvicEs, supra note 67, at 3; see also
AsHioRT, supra note 2, at 286 (noting that traditional healers have seldom if ever been prosecuted for
practicing their trade).
225. See, e.g., Cartillier, supra note 64 (describing the perceptions of healers).
226. REPORT OF THE SELECr CoMMrrrEE ON SOCIAL SERvicEs, supra note 67, at 3.
227. Cf AsHFORTH, supra note 2, at 286-87 (describing the sentiments of clients and political elite
about the laws).
228. See Comaroff & Comaroff, Policing Culture, supra note 3, at 530 (noting a perception that the
"state ha[s] failed to protect its citizenry from a clear and present danger").
229. Id. at 522.
230. See Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 (effective 2005) (S. Afr.).
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cultural tradition, and therefore it cannot qualify for inclusion in a Rawlsian
overlapping consensus, it nevertheless ought to be supported as a feasible
second-best solution.
A. GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF THE ACT
Shortly after winning the country's first national elections in 1994, the ANC
released "A National Health Plan for South Africa., 23 1 The plan was developed
with the help of the WHO and UNICEF, both of which had been calling on
African governments to recognize traditional healers and regulate traditional
medicine along with "western" or "allopathic" drugs.23 2 The Plan declared that
"[p]eople have the right of access to traditional practitioners as part of their
cultural heritage and belief system" and that traditional healers ought to be
"controlled by a recognised and accepted body so that harmful practises can be
eliminated and the profession promoted., 233 It called for "[l]egislation to change
the position and status of traditional practitioners" and for "[a] regulatory body
for traditional medicine. '234 These declarations and proposals resonated with
the new political dispensation, for, as one expert put it, "[a] government
committed to the multicultural principles enshrined in the South African Consti-
tution must be prepared to respect the practices of healing widespread among
the population., 235 But tension also existed between the proposal to recognize
witchcraft beliefs and the ANC's constitutional commitment to "non-racial-
ism."'2 36
Public hearings on traditional healers were held in 1997,237 and the following
year the Select Committee on Social Services submitted a report to Parliament
that followed much of the earlier National Health Plan.238 Meanwhile, tradi-
tional healers had begun to form professional associations in anticipation of new
legislation. These organizations, which tended to be organized along ethnic
lines, became actively involved in the development of government oversight.239
Ultimately, the Traditional Health Practitioners Act was enacted.24° The Act
231. AFIcAN NAT'L CONG., A NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN FOR SouTH AFRICA (1994), available at
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/health.htm [hereinafter A NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN].
232. ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 287-88.
233. A NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN, supra note 231.
234. Id.
235. ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 289.
236. S. AsR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 1.
237. See NAT'L PROGRESSIVE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE NErwoRK, SuMMARY BRIEF: PUBLIC HEARINGS ON
TRADITIONAL HEALERS (1997), available at http://www.healthlink.org.za/pphc/Phila/summary/
vol3_no23.htm [hereinafter SuMMARY BRIEF].
238. ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 291.
239. Id. at 195 n.7; Kanya Ndaki, Law Catches Up with Traditional Medicine, MAn. & GuARDLAN (S.
Afr.), Aug. 30, 2004 ("Currently traditional healers are organised and 'licensed' by up to 100
organisations .... Although their members subscribe to a certain code of ethics, these associations
cannot enforce this code.").
240. Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 (effective 2005).
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establishes a regulatory agency, the Traditional Health Practitioners Council,24'
tasked with registering and regulating healers.242 It explicitly acknowledges the
supernatural basis of traditional healing, though it downplays that feature. Thus,
it does not exclusively employ religio-ethnically neutral categories, although it
uses them predominantly, but instead it references specific African beliefs
surrounding occult and ancestral power. For instance, it defines "traditional
health practice" as "the performance of a function, activity, process or service
based on a traditional philosophy., 243 Traditional philosophy, in turn, refers to
"indigenous African techniques, principles, theories, ideologies, beliefs, opin-
ions and customs and uses of traditional medicines communicated from ances-
tors."24  In practice, everyone understands that traditional healers rely on
spiritual powers to do their work.245 And although the Act models itself on laws
regulating Western medicine, it nonetheless does acknowledge the supernatural
basis for traditional healing.246
Newspaper articles on the passage of the Act reported that traditional healers
were celebrating their newfound status. One sangoma explained: "Under apart-
heid, we were referred to as witch doctors, which is something that is opposite
to what we do. We concentrate on curing. Witches are people who manipulate
people's health. 247 Others healers said they were happy to have been recog-
nized by the state in the same way as western physicians.248 Local papers
reported that the purpose of the Act, in addition to dignifying traditional
healing, 'was to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate healers-
between real inyangas or sangomas and "quacks" or "charlatans"-by licensing
the former and prohibiting the latter from practicing on pain of imprisonment of
up to twelve months. 249
241. Id. s. 4(1).
242. Id. s. 19(c). The Council's purposes are, inter alia, to "ensure the quality of health services
within the traditional health practice" and to "protect and serve the interests of members of the public
who use or are affected by the services of traditional health practitioners." Id. s. 5(b)-(c).
243. Id. s. 1.
244. Id. (emphases added). In addition to herbalists and diviners, the law regulates traditional
surgeons, birth attendants, and tutors. Id.
245. See AsHFoRTH, supra note 2, at 54. Ashforth elaborates:
Virtually all healers communicate with and utilize the power of ancestors or other invisible beings in
some way. Indeed, healing in Africa generally is inconceivable without the healer invoking spiritual
beings of some variety as part of the healing practice, either as the source of diagnosis and prescription
or as the origin of medicinal remedies.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
246. Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 s. 1. The Act gives the agency little guidance on
the substance of its regulations. For instance, it prohibits those not registered as traditional healers from
diagnosing or treating cancer, AIDS, or any other terminal disease but it says nothing about whether
registered healers may do so, leaving that contentious issue to the Council. Id. s. 49(g).
247. See Cartillier, supra note 64 ("The body will also act as a watchdog against quacks."); see also
Keeton, supra note 14 ("'Traditional doctors have long been recognised by the World Health Organisa-
tion (WHO) and in other countries in Africa, but we were called names like witchdoctors under
apartheid. This Bill will be a revolution."') (quoting a traditional healer).
248. Cartillier, supra note 64.
249. Ndaki, supra note 239.
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And in fact the law does assert strong government control over all aspects of
traditional healing. People who are not registered with the Council are prohib-
ited from practicing traditional healing.250 The unauthorized practice of tradi-
tional medicine for gain, or even holding oneself out as a traditional health
practitioner without being registered, is a criminal offense punishable by fine
and imprisonment for up to one year.2
B. A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT
Several liberal principles support the Act. Regulating traditional healers
fosters a sense of equal citizenship for African traditionalists, helps to remedy
perceived injustice, shores up law and order, and bolsters the legitimacy of the
young democracy. This section assesses these four arguments in greater detail.
Admittedly, the Act involves government in drawing distinctions between legiti-
mate and illegitimate healers that make sense only within African traditions-
thereby disqualifying it for inclusion in an overlapping consensus and risking a
violation of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the Act should be promoted by
liberals as part of a second-best compromise. But this conclusion is subject to
one critical caveat, issued in the next section: To comply with liberal traditions,
Parliament must amend the Act to make its licensing scheme optional rather
than mandatory in order to protect the right of individual dissenters to exit from
the state's official conception of African religion and culture. Only then can
Parliament pursue its legitimate goals of accommodating African culture and
bolstering security without exceeding liberalism's limits.
1. Equal Citizenship
Parliament's approach to the problem of witchcraft deserves support chiefly
because it promotes a sense of equal citizenship among traditional Africans. For
too long, colonial and apartheid governments promoted policies that maligned
African traditions in general and occult beliefs in particular. A primary purpose
of the 2004 law therefore was to "restor[e] the dignity of traditional medi-
cine.' 2 52 Zimbabwe passed similar legislation shortly after independence in
1980 in order to remedy past discrimination against healers there.25 3 To many
people, democracy means that government will recognize customs that remain
central to those people's identities. And the danger that people will feel alien-
ated from public life is real. Africanization seeks to counteract exactly that sort
250. Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 s. 21(1).
251. Id. s. 49(l)(a)-(f), (4). Whether traditional healers will in fact obey any regulations is far from
clear. Healers have ignored a similar 1998 law that requires the registration and regulation of all
traditional medicines. See AsHFoRTH, supra note 2, at 299 (describing noncompliance with the South
African Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Authority Act 132 of 1998).
252. REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMrITEE ON SocIAL SERvIcEs, supra note 67, at 3.
253. Id. at 10-11. The Select Committee noted some weaknesses of the Zimbabwe approach, but
concluded that the law had significant strengths, particularly in the treatment of psychiatric patients. Id.
at l.
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of alienation among Africans.
Of course, neutralists will oppose the regulation of traditional healers because
the Act employs religio-cultural classifications. But neutralism is not the only
plausible interpretation of the liberal tradition. Another liberal approach to
questions of religious and cultural pluralism is what I will call culturalism. On
this view, liberalism can-and perhaps even must-cognize differences of
religion and culture among the citizenry. More and more, political philosophers
are arguing that religio-cultural difference has a place in liberal theory.254
Culturalism argues that simply ignoring traditional groups will often allow the
dominant group to enact government policies that discriminate implicitly or
incidentally against non-dominant traditions.255 Because standard discourses of
human and civil rights simply give no answers to problems of multiculturalism,
they often have the unintended effect of sanctioning de facto inequality.
256
Moreover, culturalists point out that whatever contemporary liberals say, all
nations in fact recognize certain group differences in their actual policies. The
only practical question is which accommodations should be supported, not
whether any ought to be.257 Culturalists may well endorse the Traditional
Health Practitioners Act because it conveys a message of political belonging
that has long been denied to Africans.
Dignity is not only an important liberal value; it is also guaranteed under the
constitution.258 Traditional healers drew on that provision when they lobbied
members of Parliament in favor of the Act. Sangomas and inyangas argued to
lawmakers that the bill of rights "embodied freedom of choice in terms of
culture, beliefs and retention of human dignity," and they "stressed that their
254. See Levy, supra note 166, at 19-20 (describing the development of "multicultural theorizing").
255. KYMucKA, MuLIcuLTuRAL CrnmzFsiw, supra note 166, at 108; Taylor, supra note 208, at 43.
256. I avoid the term multiculturalism as a name for this theoretical position because that term has
been used in many different and conflicting ways. In what follows, I use the term culturalism to refer to
a specific type of liberal theory that I define. Multiculturalism, for me, describes an empirical social
situation in many countries where multiple cultures or nations share a single country or state.
257. KYMLICKA, MuLTcuLTurAL CrrtZENSmP, supra note 166, at 129. Culturalism has at least three
varieties: culturalism of rights, of fear, and of recognition. Culturalists of rights, promoted most
effectively by Will Kymlicka, argue that traditional communities are valuable to liberalism because
they provide individuals with the sense of dignity and meaningfulness that is necessary for the exercise
of rational choice among competing ends. See id. at 83; Will Kymlicka, Liberal Complacencies, in Is
MuLIcuLTuRAusM BAD FOR WOMEN? 31, 33 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999). Because Kymlicka's
approach results in certain privileges against the state that are guaranteed as a matter of justice, it is a
culturalism of rights. Second, Jacob Levy has developed a culturalism of fear. LEvy, supra note 121, at
12. He focuses not on a theory of justice, but instead on a pragmatic liberal fear of violence and
humiliation toward groups. Religion and culture should be important to liberal democracies not as a
matter of justice or right, but instead because they form the basis of group membership that can lead to
horrifying evils such as cruelty and terror. Id. Third, Charles Taylor has endorsed (part of) a culturalism
of recognition. Here, religio-cultural groups think that they deserve not just certain rights against the
government, but also state recognition of their tradition's value and worth. Taylor himself has a difficult
time saying a priori that every culture is worthy of equal respect, but he allows that every such group
deserves at least a presumption of worthiness. Taylor, supra note 208, at 66.
258. S. AFR CONST. 1996 § 10.
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dignity had been eroded by colonial and apartheid powers., 259 A democracy, if
it is to function well, requires that each citizen feels that she or he is regarded by.
the state as having inherent worth. The 2004 Act sends this message not only to
health practitioners themselves, but also to the millions of people who consult
them seeking protection from occult harm.
2. Security of the Person and Individual Freedom
Witchcraft beliefs cause many. citizens to feel intensely vulnerable to voli-
tional attack by others. In the language of the constitution, occult harm endan-
gers security of the person. Section 12 guarantees such security, including "the
right ... to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private
sources." 260 Many Africans feel that they have a right to be protected against
assault by others, and that the democratic state so far has failed to provide the
justice and security necessary for its populace to flourish. Traditional healing
promises security in various forms, including restitution, defense against future
harm, and even limited retaliation.26' Regulating healers allows the government
to claim that it is providing some state-sanctioned response to occult insecurity.
Without relief from phantasmal vulnerability, moreover, citizens may feel
they are unable to exercise newfound democratic freedoms.262 Young activists
claimed that by killing witches they either were expunging witches who had
helped to bolster the apartheid regime or, sometimes, that they were ridding
local government of superstition. In either case, they sometimes understood
themselves to be working to advance political freedom for the local community
as a whole.
Moreover, the current alternative to state regulation, self-help in the form of
mob retaliation, threatens law and order in obvious ways. Supporters of the Act
have suggested that regulating traditional healers will help restore the state's
monopoly over legitimate coercion.263 To the degree that normalizing tradi-
tional healing can lessen the need for private actors to resort to force, the Act
may work to secure stability in this additional way.
259. REPORT OF THE SELECt COMMn-rEE ON SOCIAL SERvicEs, supra note 67, at 4.
260. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 12 ("Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which
includes the right... to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources .... ).
261. The exact form of justice that traditional healing guarantees is unclear. Ashforth has remarked
that "[t]raditional healing promises a limited form of justice akin to revenge: in treating a victim of
witchcraft, healers promise that the evil forces will be returned to their source to kill the witch who
dispatched them." AsmFORT, supra note 2, at 313.
262. See id. at 16 ("I focus upon these problems of insecurity from the conviction, grown out of
years living in Soweto, that it is only when the forces threatening harm are either mastered or kept at
bay that there is any possibility of freedom and autonomy.").
263. Cf. Hund, supra note 4, at 385, 389 n.99 (advocating the regulation of traditional healers, along
with criminalization of witchcraft itself, and warning that "many people fear that if new legislation is
not adopted soon the problem of witchcraft-related violence will spiral out of control").
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3. Popular Sovereignty and Democratic Legitimacy
One critical difference between cultural accommodation in South Africa and
in many other modem democracies is that followers of African traditions
comprise the great majority of the population there. Democracy at root means,
of course, that the government ought to obey the principle of self-determination.
And under the 1996 constitution, self-determination is defined to mean not only
that the general citizenry has a right to govern itself, but also that specific
communities enjoy a right to determine their own cultural policies.26" Questions
of multiculturalism therefore have different implications in South Africa, where
members of non-Western traditions comprise a large majority.
A government that is unresponsive to the concerns of its citizenry-or that
fails to protect them from injustice-may face a serious problem of legitimacy.
Such difficulty has been particularly acute under the Witchcraft Suppression
Act, which bans all forms of private protection against witchcraft without
providing a viable public enforcement system. Now, the Traditional Health
Practitioners Act allows the state to claim that it is being sensitive to the
insecurity felt by the people and taking steps to combat occult harm.
In sum, basic principles of liberal democracy favor the Act. Many neutralists
will take issue with this conclusion and argue that a democracy has no business
involving itself in the tenets of a particular religio-cultural group. These con-
cerns have real force and the next section will examine them carefully-
ultimately arguing that the Act must be amended. Should that amendment be
adopted, the Act deserves support from those within the liberal tradition because
it promotes equal citizenship for long-denigrated traditional communities, works
to ensure justice in the eyes of many Africans, and furthers self-determination
and governmental legitimacy.
C. AMENDING THE ACT
Two principles weigh against the Traditional Health Practitioners Act. First,
the statute threatens the rule of law because it involves the government in
making determinations that may appear arbitrary to non-Africans. Second, it
could impose an official conception of what African traditions require on people
who identify with witchcraft traditions but dissent from that state-sanctioned
interpretation of what their own culture's rules require. For instance, an indi-
vidual applicant who is denied a healer's license may disagree with the criteria
that the agency is using to make its determinations. Preserving a right of
individual dissent from group-differentiated rules is critical to virtually all
versions of liberal thought. Consequently, liberals should press for the Act to be
amended so that it guarantees the right to exit.
264. S. AFi. CONST. 1996 § 235 (protecting "the right of self-determination of any community
sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any
other way, determined by national legislation").
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1. The Rule of Law
The 2004 Act requires the Council, a government agency, to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate practitioners of traditional medicine. Yet it
does not provide criteria for minimum training, qualifications, or competency,
instead delegating the development of such guidelines to regulators. 265 Appar-
ently legislators were unable to resolve a fierce debate on the question of
qualifications.266 Conflict over credentials is hardly surprising. After all, tradi-
tional healing in Africa is thoroughly otherworldly. 267 In Soweto, for instance,
inyangas are thought to be "African scientists whose secret knowledge allows
them to perform 'miracles."'' 268 Moreover, healers are ambiguous figures whose
legitimacy is always problematic.269 Yet the central responsibility of the Coun-
cil is to license only competent healers.
The Act cannot win support from a political conception of justice capable of
attracting an overlapping consensus. That is because its rationale relies on a
particular comprehensive doctrine, namely the belief in occult power that is
common to many African worldviews. Everyone understands that traditional
medicine carries meaning only within African groups. Supporters of the Act
might reasonably hope that outsiders to African traditions could support some
limited accommodation based on general democratic principles outlined above,
including equal citizenship, justice and order, and self-determination. But non-
Africans could not be expected to endorse particular licensing determinations.
Therefore agency rulings in particular cases will fail to satisfy the requirements
of public reason, will violate the criterion of reciprocity, and cannot qualify for
inclusion in a Rawlsian overlapping consensus.27 °
The Act raises rule of law concerns for similar reasons. A formal conception
of the rule of law-the understanding that has long dominated among liberals-
holds that law ought to be certain and predictable. Equality and autonomy alike
are thought to be promoted by stable rules because citizens both feel freer to
plan their affairs around predictable government action and they receive a
message of equal citizenship.271 In other words, both freedom and equal citizen-
ship are promoted when capricious state action is banned.272 Joseph Raz
265. See Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 s. 22, 47 (S. Afr.) (delegating authority to
develop criteria).
266. See ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 293, 294 n.6.
267. See id. at 54, 294.
268. Id. at 297.
269. See GEscmrERE, supra note 15, at 197.
270. Such determinations also surely implicate constitutional essentials. Whether a practitioner of
traditional medicine will be prohibited from exercising his or her beliefs by the criminal law surely
implicates basic rights to the freedom of conscience and to the enjoyment of culture. See S. AFR. CONST.
1996 §§ 15, 31 (§ 15 (freedom of conscience), § 31 (enjoyment of culture)).
271. BRuA Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, PoLmcs, THEORY 93-94, 119 (2004)
(discussing this conception of the rule of law).
272. As one prominent theorist puts it, "to live under the rule of law is not to be subject to the
unpredictable vagaries of other individuals." Id. at 122; see also id. at 95; RONALD DwoRKiN, A MA ER
[Vol. 96:183
WITCHCRAFT AND STATECRAFr
explains that "[t]he rule of law is often rightly contrasted with arbitrary power. 273
Here, ruling on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of any particular applicant will
require the government to draw inherently spiritual distinctions that cannot
make sense to non-Africans.
One way of thinking about non-arbitrariness is that it prohibits one group
from governing according to norms that have meaning only within that tradi-
tion. To outsiders, rule under a particular religio-cultural system may be impos-
sible to fathom. Non-arbitrariness thus links up with a key idea for liberalism,
namely that the comprehensive view of one group should not be imposed on
others. 274 Anti-establishment is a way of managing pluralism once sovereignty
is located in the people as a whole. Critically here, it promotes the rule of law
conceived of as non-arbitrariness.
A difficulty with the Traditional Health Practitioners Act is that it seems to
involve a government agency in making determinations between qualified and
unqualified healers that only hold within a particular worldview. How will it be
possible for the Council to establish criteria for competent traditional heal-
ing? 275 Recall that in practice a traditional healer is seen to be competent if she
or he has experienced a genuine call from the ancestors, among other spiritual
qualifications. Certainly, healers are sometimes trained by more senior members
of the profession who serve as ad hoc mentors who may vouch for their powers.
But ultimately there is no worldly authority who can gainsay a healer's claim to
legitimacy. 276 The Council has not yet said how it will identify bona fide
healers, but whatever criteria it adopts may seem senseless and arbitrary to
outsiders. In other words, the Act, by employing arbitrary criteria, risks violat-
ing the rule of law.
Applying African norms might not at first appear troubling because people
OF PRINCIPLE 11 (1985); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AuTmoRirv OF LAW 214 (1979); JuDrm N. SHKLAR, POLMCAL
THOUGHT AND POLTCAL THINKERs 22, 25 (Stanley Hoffman ed., 1998).
273. RAZ, supra note 272, at 219, 224; see also MIcHAEL OAKESHOTr, ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS
137 (1983).
274. For example, Rawls remarks at one point that:
[T]hose who believe that fundamental political questions should be decided by what they
regard as the best reasons according to their own idea of the whole truth-including their
religious or secular comprehensive doctrine-and not by reasons that might be shared by all
citizens as free and equal, will of course reject the idea of public reason.
RAwLS, supra note 127, at 447. At another point he says, "There is no reason why any citizen...
should have the right to use state power to decide constitutional essentials as that person's, or that
association's, comprehensive doctrine suggests." Id. at 226. The criterion of reciprocity embodies for
Rawls the basic concept behind anti-establishment: A particular religious or cultural group should not
be able to impose rules that outsiders could not reasonably endorse. Id. at xliv, 446-47. Rawls's
criterion of reciprocity also connects to the rule of law as non-arbitrariness. The criterion of reciprocity
is the key concept that embodies non-arbitrariness: Citizens must be able to reasonably accept the
reasons given for the exercise of coercive government power, but they will be unable to do so if those
reasons hold only within a particular tradition but appear arbitrary outside it.
275. See AsH'oRTH, supra note 2, at 295.
276. Id.
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who apply for licenses to practice traditional healing presumably already sub-
scribe to those norms. The risk that seemingly arbitrary rules will be applied to
outsiders seems small and therefore the rule of law concerns here might also
seem minor. Yet this initial impression, which is sound as far as it goes, misses a
related concern-the treatment of dissenters.
2. The Problem of Individual Dissent
The Act predictably will stifle dissent within the community of traditional
practitioners. Africans who are denied healing licenses-or who are prosecuted
for practicing without a license-may well object to the government's concep-
tion of what African traditions require of sangomas and inyangas. Imagine, for
instance, an older woman who regularly dispenses healing herbs to family and
neighbors, perhaps in exchange for other services.27 7 She may resist the govern-
ment's determination that she is practicing traditional medicine at all.278 Dissent-
ers like her may feel that the Council has applied criteria that are capricious or
irrational. Government here risks exercising coercive power-prohibiting her
from practicing on pain of criminal punishment-in a manner that interferes
with individual autonomy and communicates a message of disfavored status.
Laws that restrict choice in this way also risk ossifying African traditions.279
Whatever else the liberal tradition requires in the context of regulating
religion and culture, it certainly mandates protecting dissent, even if only
through a right of individual exit.280 Even writers who defend an unusual degree
of autonomy for minority groups-for instance, preserving the power of groups
to insist that dissenting members follow internal rules-invariably qualify their
recommendations by insisting that government protect the right of members to
criticize group rules and to leave the group free of unusual coercion. 28' Cultural
rights themselves are often defended as legal mechanisms that promote the
277. See id. at 295-96.
278. I owe this hypothetical to a conversation with Noah Feldman.
279. Reification may be one consequence of legalizing beliefs around traditional practices. See
KYMuLicKA, MuuncurTuRAL CrnzFrsupw, supra note 166, ch.3 (discussing what he calls "internal
restrictions"); LEVY, supra note 121, at 189-90.
280. Rawls argues that although private associations can be internally illiberal, the state cannot
enforce apostasy or heresy. RAwLS, supra note 127, at 468-69; see also LEvY, supra note 121, at 191
("Although Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas disagree to a certain extent about the validity of
conservative rules within a minority group when exit is possible, they certainly unite in condemning
such rules when it is not."); Sunder, supra note 217, at 505 ("[L]iberals have argued that cultural rights
wrongly place the autonomy of the group over the autonomy of the individual .... Building on these
critiques ... I seek to present a sustained polemic for legal recognition of autonomy and plurality
within cultural identity-that is, cultural dissent.").
281. See, e.g., Kukathas, supra note 208, at 116 (arguing that indigenous groups should be left alone
to govern their own affairs but insisting that "[i]f there are any fundamental rights, then there is at least
one right which is of crucial importance: the right of the individual to leave a community or association
by the terms of which he or she no longer wishes to live"); Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal,
Liberalism and the Right to Culture, 61 Soc. REs. 491, 491-92 (2004) (arguing that the state must
sometimes abandon its neutrality and actively assist cultural groups, even illiberal ones, but insisting on
a right to exit).
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ability of individual citizens to exercise their ability to choose to associate with
others in a community-and conversely to disassociate.282 Failing to protect
objectors undermines one of the best democratic rationales for vigorous cultural
and religious rights in the first place.
Why should traditional healers be able to dissent from government licensing
decisions? After all, Western doctors enjoy no comparable right, even though
they might disagree with state medical standards. And as a general matter, we
do not tolerate individual disagreement with criminal laws. Yet matters are
different where the government accommodates specific religio-cultural groups
by using state power to enforce group-differentiated rules, such as those that
identify legitimate traditional healers according to inherently supernatural crite-
ria. When government bolsters group rules in this way, protecting an individual
right to exit becomes critical.
What is even more troubling about the Traditional Health Practitioners Act is
that it not only authorizes the use of state power to impose a particular
conception of traditional healing on members of African traditions, thereby
stifling heterodoxy within the community, but it also criminalizes any practice
of traditional healing even outside that group. Government officials will police
the unauthorized practice of traditional medicine not only by self-identified
healers-itself a control on dissent-but also by people who do not claim to be
inyangas or sangomas but nevertheless fall under the Act's wide definition of
traditional healer as anyone who uses "indigenous African techniques. 283
3. A Proposed Amendment
The Act must be amended in order to better protect the individual right of exit
if it is not to exceed the limits of liberalism. Instead of imposing a mandatory
licensing regime with accompanying criminal sanctions, Parliament might make
the Act's provisions permissive. That would allow healers who dissent from the
state's licensing determinations to continue to practice. Much of the existing
law could be retained, including the Council's core power to distinguish be-
tween authentic and inauthentic healers, but its licenses would merely inform
those seeking services in the open market rather than restricting client choice.
Citizens could consider whether healers are licensed by the state when deciding
whether to enlist their services. Yet clients who disagree with the government's
criteria would be free to hire unaccredited practitioners.284 Parliament would
282. Will Kymlicka takes this view, which has been influential in the literature. See, e.g., Kukathas,
supra note 208, at 116.
283. Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 s. 1.
284. Amending the Act in this way may hamper its effectiveness, admittedly, because it will weaken
Parliament's claim to be doing something to address the problem of witchcraft, but that cost must be
borne in order to protect critical rights.
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simply enrich the market for occult medicine by providing information. 285 Of
course, to the degree that inyangas or sangomas engage in behavior that is
objectively harmful-for instance, by prescribing herbs or medicines that cause
physical illness-government should (and does under existing drug laws) have
the power to regulate traditional medicine, including the ability to punish
wrongdoers under the criminal law. 286 Yet to the extent that government seeks
to impose criteria for legitimate healing that violate the criterion of reciprocity,
in the sense that they appear arbitrary or irrational to outsiders to the tradition or
dissenters within it, Parliament should make those rules permissive rather than
mandatory. A voluntary licensing scheme would bolster individual autonomy of
both healers and their clients.287 At the same time, it would serve many of
Parliament's legitimate purposes: dignifying African culture and promoting
equal citizenship, giving citizens a sense of state-aided security, answering the
call of the majority for cultural self-determination, and bolstering law and order.
V. CRIMINALIZING WITCHCRAFT
A. CURRENT PROPOSALS
Prominent African politicians and intellectuals have called on Parliament to
outlaw the practice of witchcraft. Virtually no one is happy with the Witchcraft
Suppression Act-the law is seen to be a vestige of colonial policies that
disparaged indigenous beliefs. Consequently, African traditionalists are pressing
legislators to repeal the 1957 Act and impose a state monopoly on the policing
of occult wrongdoing. According to one local commentator, the Department of
Justice is under "serious pressure" to draft new legislation.2 8 Zimbabwe's
passage of a criminal ban in 2006 can only have increased that pressure.
The Ralushai Commission first urged lawmakers to criminalize "any act
which creates a reasonable suspicion that [one] is engaged in the practice of
witchcraft" and to impose a sentence of four years' imprisonment and/or a fine
285. This proposal is analogous in certain ways to an administrative mechanism whereby agencies,
instead of prohibiting harmful conduct, recommend best practices. See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 294 (2005).
286. South African Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Act 132 of 1998.
287. Amending the law may also aid enforcement. Ashforth questions the Act's workability, calling
it "pure fantasy" to think that traditional healers will voluntarily submit to regulatory control. AsH-
FORTH, supra note 2, at 288, 298. He points out that traditional healers have made no move to submit
their medicines to regulatory review by the Medicines Control Council as required by the Medicines
Act. Id. at 299. Making the 2004 Act permissive rather than mandatory might give healers a
market-based incentive to seek accreditation. Because clients may prefer a licensed healer to an
unlicensed one, healers may attract more business if they obtain government approval. There is a
critical theoretical distinction between requiring conformity to certain cultural rules and incentivizing it
in this way.
288. Hund, supra note 4, at 385; see also id. at 389 n.99 ("Pressure is building on the Department of
Justice. The South African Law Commission is also under pressure to draft new legislation to replace
the 1957 Act.").
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of up to R4,000.2 8 9 That proposal has been politically influential to some
degree. In 1998 and 1999, the Commission on Gender Equality, a national
agency, held conferences on witchcraft violence. 290 At the first of those meet-
ings, Seth Nthai, former minister of Safety and Security for the Northern
Province, told participants that it "goes without saying that practitioners of
witchcraft should be brought to trial."'29 1 He proposed that sorcerers be arrested
by traditional police and tried in traditional courts with an emphasis on media-
tion and other alternative forms of dispute resolution common in African
traditional societies. "We should build on the African experience," he urged,
"and make our justice system more responsive to the plight of victims of
witchcraft-related crimes.' 292 At the end of the 1998 conference, delegates
approved the Thohoyandou Declaration. While it did not unambiguously en-
dorse criminalization, the declaration did urge new legislation under which
"those who are engaged in harmful practices can be separated out from those
who are falsely accused" so that witchcraft issues will no longer be handled
"outside the criminal justice system., 293 Later, the Institute for Multi-Party
Democracy, a non-governmental organization, recommended special state courts
for the prosecution of witches and sorcerers.294 Intellectuals working in the area
have likewise called for witches to be tried in state criminal courts.295
Efforts like these to criminalize sorcery ought to be resisted by liberals. This
Part warns that their success would damage liberal-democratic principles includ-
ing the rule of law, equal citizenship, and individual freedom. After comparing
the sobering experience of Cameroon, a country that already prosecutes witches
in state courts, the Part argues that the potential dangers of criminalization far
outweigh its potential contributions to the achievement of liberal aspirations.
289. RALusHAi Er AL., supra note 22, at 55; see also AsHFoRTH, supra note 2, at 262-63. The
Ralushai proposal is based on a belief in the reality of witchcraft. See supra Part II.E.
290. Proceedings from the 1998 conference were published in a volume titled Witchcraft Violence
and the Law in South Africa. See Hund, supra note 24, at 7-8; see also Hund, supra note 4, at 385;
AsmFoRTm, supra note 2, at 264-65.
291. Seth A. Nthai, Witchcraft Violence and the Need for New Legislation, in WrrcNCRAFr VIOLENCE
AND Ta LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 131, 135.
292. Id.
293. THOHOYANDou DECLAATION, supra note 24, 3-4, reprinted in ASHFORTH, supra note 2, at 325.
Some have reported that conference delegates did indeed recommend that witchcraft itself be outlawed.
Harnischfeger, supra note 2, at 61; Hund, supra note 4, at 369. According to another source, the
"conference rejected outlawing witchcraft." Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, South Africans Go on Witch Hunts,
BALT. SuN, Sept. 27, 1998, at IA.
294. These would not be traditional African courts, but rather specialized government tribunals. See
John Hund, African Witchcraft and Western Law, in WrrcHcRAr VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN SoUTm
AFRICA, supra note 2, at 9, 34-35.
295. In addition to Nthai and members of the Ralushai Commission, John Hund discourages the use
of traditional courts, which he says "are no longer held in high esteem by most African people" and in
any case "have all but collapsed." Id. at 34; see also Hund, supra note 4, at 387. Traditional healers
would have a central role in state-court trials, serving as expert witnesses that could identify sorcerers.
Hund, supra note 294, at 35.
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B. CRIMINALIZATION IN CAMEROON
Anxiety about witchcraft is so widespread in Africa that citizens across the
.continent have been calling on governments to protect them against occult
296aggression. This section looks at the experience of Cameroon for two rea-
sons. First, that country has long been conducting well-documented trials of
suspected witches. Second, Cameroon's law has influenced some South African
proponents of criminalization.297
Cameroon, like a few other countries, outlawed witchcraft shortly after it
gained independence from colonial rule in 1960.298 Yet for twenty years offi-
cials hesitated to enforce the statute, fearing that guilt of witchcraft would be
impossible to establish by objective proof.29 9 As post-colonial Cameroon ma-
tured, its reluctance to prosecute witches slowly eased and it began to conduct
witchcraft trials around 1980.300 Judges in the East Province led the way, often
convicting witches on the uncorroborated expert testimony of a single tradi-
tional healer.30 ' A leading ethnographer called these early trials "surprising-
not to say shocking-because they constitute[d] a dramatic reversal of the
preceding jurisprudence," under which healers, not witches, had been at risk of
302prosecution.
For many Cameroonian officials, modernization did not bring disenchant-
ment but instead an effort to better combat occult aggression.30 3 Today, prosecu-
tion of witches is still most common in the East Province, but it is increasingly
prevalent in other regions as well. 304 A state prosecutor explained that the
296. GEscmERE, supra note 15, at 169.
297. See, e.g., Hund, supra note 4, at 385.
298. See generally Cyprian F. Fisiy, Containing Occult Practices: Witchcraft Trials in Cameroon, 41
AF. STuD. REV. 143 (1998). Section 251 of Cameroon's 1967 Penal Code reads in pertinent part:
Whoever commits any act of witchcraft, magic or divination liable to disturb public order or
tranquility, or to harm another person, property or substance, whether by taking a reward or
otherwise, shall be punished with imprisonment for from two to ten years and with a fine of
five thousand to one hundred thousand francs.
Id. at 144. Other literature on witchcraft trials in Cameroon includes GESCIME, supra note 15, at
169-97; Diane Ciekawy & Peter Geschiere, Containing Witchcraft: Conflicting Scenarios in Postcolo-
nial Africa, 41 AFm STU. REv. 1 (1998); Cyprian F. Fisiy & Peter Geschiere, Judges and Witches, or
How is the State to Deal with Witchcraft?: Examples from Southeast Cameroon, 118 CAHERS D'ETUDES
AmcAIEs 135 (1990); Cyprian F. Fisiy &'Michael Rowlands, Sorcery and Law in Modem Cameroon,..
6 CuLTuRE & HIST. 63 (1989); Peter Geschiere & Cyprian Fisiy, Domesticating Personal Violence:
Witchcraft, Courts and Confessions in Cameroon, 64 AFP. 323 (1994); Harnischfeger, supra note 2, at
48-50.
299. See GEscHmRE, supra note 15, at 169.
300. Id. at 5-6.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 6; see also Geschiere & Fisiy, supra note 298, at 329.
303. See Fisiy, supra note 298, at 151 ("The new elite implicitly recognize the existence of
witchcraft in the sociocultural context in which they live, but they have sought to sanitize it by
incriminating such practices.").
304. GEscHmRE, supra note 15, at 184, 186 (describing some local variation in the frequency of
witchcraft trials).
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government had an obligation to resist witchcraft: "We should not pretend that
witchcraft does not exist. It is very much alive here in the East Province... . It
is witchcraft that is drawing back development in this province.,, 30 5 Another
prosecutor felt more ambivalent. On the one hand, he agreed that the state must
respond to popular calls for containing witchcraft because the only alternative-
private enforcement-was utterly unacceptable. 3° On the other hand, he was
reluctant to charge witches without tangible proof of their guilt sufficient to
satisfy the "positivism" of the "letter of the law."'30 7 Tension between these two
governmental objectives-addressing occult harm and upholding the rule of
law-reflects what one leading scholar has called "a much deeper crisis of the
postcolonial state.,
308
Cameroon's criminal ban on witchcraft has drawn sharp criticism from
outside observers. 309 They have worried that occult aggression, which is undetect-
able by ordinary methods, is impossible to prove in any principled way.3'0 A
survey of some forty witchcraft cases showed no pattern of outcomes that could
be correlated to identifiable fact patterns.31' Whether a witch was convicted
seemed to depend solely on testimony from traditional healers and the "firm
conviction" of the judge.312 (Today traditional healers in Cameroon often also
initiate prosecutions, bringing accused witches to the attention of the state
courts.) Courts, in sum, have been heavily criticized for irrationality and
arbitrariness.
C. AGAINST A WITCHCRAFT BAN
This section explains why averting a criminal ban on witchcraft is critical to
the future of liberal democracy in southern Africa. After acknowledging some
attractive features of criminalization, it ultimately warns of four overriding
perils: to public reason and the rule of law, to equal citizenship, to the ability of
individual members to dissent from African traditions, and finally to the flexibil-
ity of those same traditions.
1. Advantages
Criminalization would seem to serve many of the same values that support
the Traditional Health Practitioners Act. Like that law, a criminal statute would
305. Fisiy, supra note 298, at 160.
306. GESCHIERE, supra note 15, at 185.
307. Id.
308. Fisiy, supra note 298, at 157.
309. See, e.g., id.; GEscHmtE, supra note 15, at 195.
310. See GESCHIERE, supra note 15, at 169, 177-79; Fisiy, supra note 298, at 161.
311. See Fisiy, supra note 298, at 160.
312. Id. at 156 (quoting Ministere Public & Mvondo c/ N. Jacqueline, Arret No. 355/COR of March
22, 1984, Bertoua Court of Appeal). Reportedly the use of traditional healers as expert witnesses is
more prevalent in the Francophone part of the country, which uses an inquisitorial procedure, for
gathering evidence, than in the Anglophone region, where common law rules of evidence are much less
likely to tolerate the use of a "witch-doctor" as an expert witness. Id. at 160.
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promote self-determination for Africans.3 3 Presumably, policing occult aggres-
sion would do a great deal to make citizens feel secure, thereby strengthening
the legitimacy of the government against the criticism that it is not doing
enough to protect the populace against all forms of violence.31 4 Such a law
might also work to restore the equal citizenship of indigenous people.315 New
proposals to ban occult harm recognize African beliefs and aim to return to
them a sense of dignity and belonging.31 6 They also promote the right to
culture.317 Finally, acting decisively to address occult concerns may discourage
violent self-help. Whatever the strengths of these advantages, however, they are
overbalanced by the perils of criminalization.
2. The Rule of Law
Identifying, charging, and convicting witches depends on divinatory tech-
niques that only make sense within a particular comprehensive viewpoint.
Proposals to criminalize witchcraft therefore violate the Rawlsian criterion of
reciprocity: They cannot be accepted by reasonable people who are not adher-
ents of that culture. Methods that traditional healers use to detect the secret
practice of sorcery necessarily involve supernatural practices whose logic is
opaque to observers.
Divination involves just the sort of governmental arbitrariness prohibited by
virtually all versions of the rule of law. One way to think of the rule of law, I
have suggested, is as a concern with state establishment of a particular religio-
cultural system. Here, subjecting accused witches to state trials involving
phantasmal evidence threatens to impose African customs on disbelievers.
Evidence from Cameroon suggests that judicial reliance on expert testimony
from traditional healers has become virtually exclusive. Subjecting defendants
to state coercion that they view as senseless strikes at the heart of individual
dignity and autonomy.
A skeptic might wonder why the Traditional Health Practitioners Act, which I
have endorsed to a degree, does not present much the same difficulty for the
rule of law. Two differences separate the statutes. First, people who apply for a
license to practice traditional healing will themselves presumably subscribe to
313. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 235 (protecting "the right of self-determination of any community
sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any
other way, determined by national legislation").
314. See id. § 12 ("Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the
right... to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources .... ").
315. At least one theorist argues that the state has no business strengthening feelings of belonging
among religious or cultural groups. See Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in ETHmcrry AND
GROUP RIGHTs: NOMOS XXXIX 69 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997); Chandran Kukathas,
Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Political Community, 13 Soc. PnE. & POL'Y 80-104 (1996). My
sense is that bolstering equal citizenship may well be appropriate in a liberal democracy-for instance,
that is one chief benefit of the Traditional Health Practitioners Act.
316. See KYMLiCKA, MurLTicuurTRAL CrrzEusiup, supra note 166, at 192; LEvY, supra note 121, at
185-86.
317. S. AM. CONST. 1996 § 31 (protecting the right to culture).
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African traditions-and to the extent that they do not, the amendment I have
urged will protect them from the worst government coercion-whereas defen-
dants who face witchcraft charges may well be outsiders. There is no workable
way to exempt outsiders or dissenters from a criminalization scheme. Therefore
government coercion may well impact people who think its actions violate the
rule of law.
Second, the consequences of any arbitrary government action under criminal-
ization proposals are much more severe than under the 2004 Act. Imprisonment
is obviously a harsher consequence than the denial of a license to practice
traditional medicine, particularly if the Act is altered in the way I have sug-
gested. Convicting someone who claims to be innocent of witchcraft, and who
perhaps even denies its reality, imposes a cost that ought to be intolerable in a
liberal democracy. Thus, proposals to criminalize witchcraft present much more
serious difficulties for the rule of law than does the 2004 Act.
3. Equal Citizenship
While criminalization proposals might assuage longstanding feelings of subor-
dination among members of African communities, they nevertheless might
impose heavy citizenship costs on non-Africans. Constitutional law commits the
country to a "common South African citizenship, ' '318 as well as to "non-
racialism" ' 31 9 and to "one, sovereign, democratic state., 320 Those commitments
cut against criminalization, on balance.
Non-Africans may experience Parliament's accommodation of witchcraft
beliefs as an endorsement of the majority culture that alienates them from the
political community. Numerical minorities-Afrikaners, English-speaking whites,
Indians, and so-called colored people-may feel that the country exists to serve
the African majority. For similar reasons, the ANC has long recognized that a
feeling" of inclusiveness among non-Africans is critical to the success of the
democracy. Yet outlawing witchcraft might send an official message to individu-
als in these groups that they are disfavored members of the political community.
Creating the perception of an African nation within the larger state, complete
with its own criminal law, is potentially destabilizing, adversely impacting both
Africans and non-Africans. 321 Self-determination of this extreme sort may
partly detach a group from the general law, undermining its fidelity to the wider
nation.3 2 Laws criminalizing occult harm might lead whites, coloreds, and
Indians to experience enervated political membership. That would damage
equal citizenship for non-Africans and fracture national unity for everyone.
318. S. AFL CONST. 1996 § 3.
319. Id. § 1.
320. Id.
321. See KmucA, supra note 166, at 192; LEvY, supra note 121, at 185.
322. See LEVY, supra note 121, at 186.
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4. Individual Dissent
A distinct difficulty is that members of African traditions who disagree with
the government's determination of criminal culpability cannot opt out of a
system of criminal punishment. Protestations that a diviner has erred and
identified the wrong person would have to be assessed from within the criminal
trial in the same manner as any other plea of innocence. Certainly dissenters in
this context would be able to argue that subjecting them to prosecution violates
fundamental rights of conscience. Yet for criminalization to have any bite at all,
it would have to apply to everyone, including to people who object that they are
not in fact sorcerers, once sorcery is understood in the right way. Individual
dissent could not be tolerated-and that intolerance counsels against a criminal
ban.
5. Ossifying Culture
Finally, incorporating rules of customary law into the state criminal justice
system risks reifying African traditions. That risk may be mitigated by the use
of expert testimony from traditional healers, who will remain free to alter their
judgments in individual cases. But the body of case law that will develop
around witchcraft trials cannot help but impede the free evolution of African
customs. State enforcement of indigenous criminal laws ought to be avoided.
In sum, then, liberal democrats should strenuously resist efforts to criminalize
occult practices. Central liberal commitments to the rule of law, to equal
citizenship, to the right of individual dissent, and to avoiding state stultification
of traditional culture cut against the idea, ultimately. Outlawing witchcraft itself
as part of a move toward Africanization would push beyond the limits of liberal
democracy.
CONCLUSION
Democratic South Africa has arrived at a critical moment in its short history.
Liberal ideas central to the constitution--especially non-racialism and a unified
rule of law for all citizens-are now being challenged by the politics of
Africanization. Calls for greater accommodation of African traditions have
concerned several areas of law, perhaps none as incendiary as the state regula-
tion of occult-related practices. Measures concerning witchcraft confront the
nation with questions that go to the heart of its constitution as a liberal
democracy. This Article has argued that certain ideals must be compromised if
that political form is to have a future in southern Africa. At the same time,
liberalism must defend its limits. With respect to witchcraft laws, this Article
has drawn the line at criminalization of sorcery itself. Others might demur.
What matters most is the legitimacy and character of liberal democracy in
Africa and globally.
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